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United States Commitments

PART II. THE NEW RESPONSIBILITIES

by Charles B. Marshall

Americans embraced the United Nations with the highest enthusiasm 7 years ago. They saw in it an opportunity to avoid repeating the default in the sequel to World War I, when we passed up participation in the League of Nations.

Some belief, derived from the habits of our historic past, in the availability of perfect solutions to problems also impelled the Americans to welcome the idea of an organization that would encompass the world and provide the framework for an enduring answer to the problem of peace.

Yet the United Nations was not intended to be, and could not be, the agency for solving the problems of the uncompleted peace. To have tried to make it a mechanism for creating the peace would have placed insupportable burdens on it. Its utility was to be in preserving peace once peace had been established.

This is not derogatory to the United Nations. It has not fulfilled the most optimistic expectations. Yet on balance, the world and especially our side in the great confrontation are much better served by having it than not having it.

The establishment of a new and complete framework of world peace and the fulfillment by the United Nations of its mission of preserving the peace once it was established depended on a unison among the Great Powers. That unison has not materialized. The reason for this is the waywardness of the Soviet Union and those in its camp.

In retrospect it seems unrealistic for anyone ever to have expected in the wake of the war that unanimity necessary for making and keeping peace through the universal channel.

Yet we must remember that collaboration of a sort had been established during the war between the western allies and the Soviet Union. They pursued efforts against a common enemy even if they were not quite common efforts. They had agreed at least on the rhetoric stating the aims for peace. The Russian defense of the homeland had

obscured for a time the inherent character of the regime. So there were reasons, even if misleading ones, for the high hopes.

The collaboration between the western allies and the Soviet Union was nothing like as close and systematic as that obtaining among the western allies, which came to common policies in all vital respects. It is easy to use the wisdom of hindsight and observe that the western coalition should have been kept intact as a necessity in the sequel to, as in the course of, hostilities. Yet it does no more good to criticize the policies of an earlier year in the light of the wisdom of a later one than for a man to sit in judgment upon his boyhood.

U.S. Policy Toward the U.S.S.R.

When abroad, and even back in the United States, I often hear the observations that the foreign policy of the United States is just the negative one of being anti-Soviet and that, except for the Soviet Union, the United States would not have the foreign policy which it does have.

These two contentions amount to about the same thing. I shall not dispute them.

To be negative about subversion is to be positive about upholding decency and order. To be negative about oppression is to be positive about free institutions. To be negative about reaction is to be positive about progress. To be negative about aggression is to be positive about security. So I do not regard it as a reproach to say that U.S. foreign policy is anti-Soviet. That is just an unclear way of identifying the things advocated by the United States as the things which the Soviet Union would destroy and the things which the Soviet Union would impose as the things which the United States would prevent.

I see little merit in trying to imagine what U.S. foreign policy would be in a world situation minus Soviet power and implacability, for these are two

cardinal factors of the world situation. The main question is what our policy is in response to the situation as it is, rather than what it would be if the situation were different.

Let us look at the critical points about the adversary's camp as an American sees them. I shall refer only to the general essences and not attempt a detailed description of the Soviet Union itself and its satellites in Europe and its Asian partner and the Asian satellites.

The first characteristic is the conspiratorial character of the rulership. As conspirators who achieved power and than have never dared risk their hold on it by any valid procedure of consent, they can only use oppression as an instrument of ruling. This requires a monopoly on the communication of ideas because they dare not suffer the emergence of any grouping capable of independent opinion.

This requires the envelopment of society and the closure of the boundaries, for any set of ideas coming in from abroad would inevitably be a challenge to the control which the rulers require.

This carries with it the identification of the small ruling elite with the state itself. It is more accurate to say that it is a conspiracy which uses the state as a screen, as a mask.

The dogma employed in its service focuses upon the elements of conflict as the norm of politics, emphasizing class war, subversion, and the like. It also purports to offer the believer certitude about the way of the future, a one-shot solution for everything, a simplification of every complexity into absolutes, a deceptive refuge from the contingent nature of life itself. The dogma fits supremely well the purposes of an unaccountable and tyrannous rule simply because it provides utopian irrelevance rather than the pertinent facts as a basis for rationalizing its actions.

This is the use of ideology in the strict sense in which Napoleon used the term—a set of theories designed to conceal political reality. By conspiratorial character and by ideology the regime is enabled to lead a double life—to act one way and proclaim another and to work in ceaseless and covert hostility even while engaging in the forms of legitimate relationship. One is reminded of lines from *Henry IV, Part 2*—

Upon my tongues continual slanders ride:
The which in every language I pronounce,
Stuffing the ears of men with false reports,
I speak of peace while covert enmity,
Under the smile of safety, wounds the world. . . .

Earlier I spoke of the evolving movement outward from Europe in past centuries and of the United States as perhaps the most successful product of that process. I want to emphasize the sharp contrast between the Soviet system and the evolving relationship of the overseas outposts and Western Europe.

Origin of the Soviet System

The Soviet system began with a base taken over by conspiratorial communism from historic Russia—which had moved eastward through the Urals, across Siberia, and onto Central and Eastern Asia in the same period as the movement outward from Europe.

By conquest through military means and by the imposition of regimes national in outward form but morally the subjects of the Kremlin, this base was enormously aggrandized in World War II and its sequel. The scope and resource of the imperium were enormously expanded by the accession of control in China by a regime having common cause with the Kremlin.

This imperium, bearing now on North and Central Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Asian subcontinent, on Southeast Asia, on South Korea, Japan, and across the Polar Cap onto Canada and the United States, is served by auxiliary forces beyond its borders—political groups disguised as parties but in substance embryo governments responsive to the purposes of the Kremlin.

This arrangement for extending the span of control, yet always keeping it rigidly under the will of the central authority, seeks to do with greater effect and imagination what the misguided program of the Nazis tried to do—exercising a claim of allegiance and obedience over citizens and subjects of other states and trying to reverse the trend toward equality and freedom among the world's components and extend a central imperial dominion over areas of established independence.

There has been a lot of sterile argument whether the Kremlin has a design for world conquest. Certainly the ruling group there regards as its enemy everything not subject to its will. Certainly the existence anywhere in the world of a potential for effective action counter to its will is a challenge to the Kremlin. Certainly it must remove such challenge if it can. So the argument about a design, a schedule for conquest, is really beside the point. The Kremlin can accept the existence of other forces, other wills, only if they are too weak to be of account or if they are too strong to risk confronting. Wherever feebleness in morale or in the capabilities of resistance gives it the opportunity, it will impose its power directly or insinuate it through those who do its bidding.

Whether conquering by design or by inertia, a Soviet control first over Europe and then extended over the Eurasian land mass would establish a position of utmost danger to the United States and to the survival at home of the values set forth in its Constitution.

This brings us to the logic of the interdependence in the world of peoples who prefer to stand beyond the Kremlin span of control. The United States cannot be strong enough if the others fall. It cannot count on their retaining the morale and

the resources to stand in independence if they are weak. It cannot count on their generating sufficient strength without American help. So the security of the United States calls for a strong United States among strong friends. That is the simple logic behind the system of coalitions as we see the logic.

Strength, moreover, is not the product merely of military capability but derives also from political, economic, and social forces. The relation among the factors is one of multiplication and not of addition. Deficiency in any factor throws the whole equation out of balance. This means that an effective coalition in the modern sense must correlate all the factors of strength.

An awareness of all this, not dawning in one moment but emerging stage by stage in the experiences from 1945 onward, brought the United States to the necessity of creating the conditions for peace as best it could in the portions of the world with which it was still possible to enter into relationships based on mutual respect and comity.

The general precedent was already established in our minds in the inter-American structure.

The Monroe Doctrine, which we had developed in the era when we were a land power dependent on Britain for the securing of the oceans, came with the passage of time to be an obsolete framework for the security of the Americas.

The first steps in obsolescence were our emergence on the world stage as a sea power and the concomitant emergence of Latin America as an overseas cosmopolis playing a role in world affairs in its own right.

With the coming of air power the changes in the picture were further sharpened. Security in an air age requires the collaboration of friendly areas in positions of internal as well as external integrity. In an air age the security of the American Hemisphere came to require the free collaboration of the Latin Americans and could no longer be the function merely of the United States holding onto a few marginal bases.

This change, toward which events had developed over decades, was registered in the American consciousness with final clarity in World War II. It produced a declaration of mutual security subscribed to by the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics at Havana in 1940. It was further articulated in a declaration of the Foreign Ministers at Rio de Janeiro in 1942, soon after the coming of World War II to the American Continent. At Mexico City in 1945, in the waning months of hostilities, the Governments of the American Republics drew up a systematic regional arrangement for international peace and security in the American Hemisphere and recommended the conclusion of a treaty "to prevent and repel threats and acts of aggression against any of the countries of America." This last step was taken at a conference at Rio de Janeiro in the late summer of 1947, and the Rio Security Pact is now public law

in the American Hemisphere along with regional charters of international cooperation in all fields in the Organization of American States. Care was taken in the drawing up of the U.N. Charter to accommodate such regional arrangements, and the Rio Pact represents in essence an attempt to realize in one great area the purposes which the Charter stipulated for the world.

We must not exaggerate the merits of the conditions of the American Hemisphere. Democracy is still a goal rather than a reality in many of its parts. The component states of the American system are not in perfect unison in their purposes. South America is pulled, even if it is not riven, by rivalries; and by the inexorable principles of politics, the United States, being in a continent apart, serves as a balancer of these rivalries just as the United Kingdom historically served as a balancer of the power equations in respect to the European Continent.

In the main, the position looks sound and we can regard as a success the United States' first venture into an alliance since the passing arrangement with France during the American Revolution.

North Atlantic Arrangements

Let us look now to the North Atlantic arrangements in which Canada and the United States serve as the Western mainstays. Incidentally, in connection with the uniqueness of the American position in the world we should mention that the United States alone among all the countries has the privilege of having Canada for a neighbor. Whatever else we may disagree on in foreign policy, all Americans agree that that is an enviable position.

The North Atlantic arrangement has developed not with the logic of a plan struck off in a moment of intellectual enlightenment but in the logic determined by events.

The first impulse in that direction came in the spring of 1947 when the United States brought its support to bear to bolster up Greece and Turkey, then confronting a Moscow-inspired effort which combined the techniques of military pressure and those of political demoralization and, in the case of Greece, the employment of large-scale violence.

The same logic as impelled our support of Greece and Turkey applied, as events made clear, to the sustaining of the areas of Western Europe disposed to stand in independence against Soviet pressure and encroachment.

The Marshall Plan was brought forward to help our friends act in concert in pulling themselves out of the economic doldrums and to correct the dislocations which provided the Soviet thrust with its opportunity to undermine them from within.

The North Atlantic alliance, coupled with the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, formed the pattern for enabling our allies to withstand the pressure which Soviet military power was exerting against them from without. It simply registered the situation that the Soviet Army was deployed into Central Europe and was leaning against them and that they could not lean back against it without the brace of American support.

Some voices in America were raised in support of the idea of a guarantee to Europe in the pattern of the Monroe Doctrine, which had once served but had now grown obsolete as the frame of security for the American Hemisphere. They were not so much concerned about adding the weight of American power to redress the balances in Europe as they were about the idea of doing this in a collaborative arrangement. They simply did not want to face or to permit our actions to reflect the circumstance of mutual dependence between ourselves and our allies.

Yet by now, I think, most Americans see and accept that the resort to an alliance simply registers the circumstance that American military power is not self-sufficient but requires for its full effectiveness the maintenance of air bases abroad in surroundings of integrity. By the same token they have come to accept the deployment of American forces to help redress the ground balances in Europe until such time as our allies shall be able to produce strength enough alone.

Coalition Problems

The way of a coalition is not easy. The experience of being in one calls to mind repeatedly the limitations of power, the disparity between what we would and what we can do.

It is easier to do for another nation in the material sphere than in the moral sphere.

No part of the West feels strong enough to face the challenge confidently alone. The problems arise from the question: How are the parts of the West to pull themselves together so as to face the challenge successfully in concert? Now if it can thus pull itself together, the conclusion of its struggle with the adversary seems foregone. On balance, the peoples, the talents, the positions, and the resources available to the West are preponderant over those that might be brought to bear against them.

If the tangible factors were all that counted, the crisis could be settled on an adding machine. But the tangible factors are not all that count. The final determinants appear to be the imponderables to which Napoleon referred as the ruling factors of history.

One of these is will. A second is confidence. Both of these turn on how the West looks at itself—that is to say, how the determining number of individuals of the West look upon life, upon their role in life, and the role of the nations to

which they belong, on how the view of the determining number is evoked and made politically effective. Still further, that itself involves another imponderable—political power and leadership.

The process of enabling the West to pull itself together embraces two ranges: The first is within Europe itself—how the Western continental nations are to combine their efforts. The second is the transatlantic range—how the strength of the Western Hemisphere is to be combined with that of the eastern reaches of the Atlantic and of the European Continent.

These are different yet interrelated problems. Progress must be concurrent and developments in either range contingent upon developments in the other.

The problem on the Continent is first of all a moral one. The recovery plan and the defense effort have worked. Their success is measurable in every concrete category. There remains the problem of Europe's regard for itself. For that there is no vicarious solution. That is in the range of things where a society, as an individual, must master its own problems.

Europe's second problem derives from an inner mistrust. There is a reason for this. In the long past the military strength generated in the West has been turned upon the West. The wounds from which the West has been recovering were largely self-inflicted wounds. So there is a fear of strength itself lest the strength again be turned inwardly. That is the problem of Germany.

Whether and how the paradoxes can be resolved so as to permit German strength to serve rather than be parasitic upon the defense of Europe, and to insure against German dominance, and how the internal margins of political power can be enlarged among the countries of the West so as to enable them to forge ahead with confidence and continuity in their programs—those problems remain with us and their solution lies beyond the span of American decision. We can only note these problems here and pass on to other areas.

In the Pacific and East Asia we find the contest for the future in a phase of active hostilities in two places—Indochina and Korea. At a third point—at Formosa—American armed strength is interposed to prevent a position of consequence from falling into the hands of those who serve the adversary's purposes.

I shall speak only briefly of these three points. We admire the intrepidity of native and French resistance in Indochina and are supporting it.

As agent of the United Nations in the command in Korea we have demonstrated a determination to avoid being drawn into a generalized war that could serve only the ultimate purposes of the adversary. At the same time we have steadfastly refused to end hostilities on terms that would only redound to the adversary's ultimate success. We also have shown that we value the blood of Asian friends as highly as our own.

As to Formosa, there is certainly no present or foreseeable intention that the United States will permit this position to pass into the control of adversary forces.

The Communist Threat in Asia

Communist imperialism is a greater immediate threat in East Asia than in Europe. Through the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact the free nations of Europe have built up strength to such a position as to block the adversary from making further gains without engaging in all-out war. This is not yet true in the Far East. Many of the new countries just beginning to reach stability have many still unsolved problems and lack a sufficiency of trained leaders. It is easy for communism to spread chaos in Asia. That is why I say the greater threat is there. The greatest source of danger is constant pressure, subversion, and infiltration whereby the new and weak governments of Asia can be kept weak and divided among themselves. We are trying to prevent that by helping these countries to help themselves through our economic and military aid programs.

The oceans are one entity. Loss of security in any ocean area means for a maritime power the instant impairment and the potential loss of security in others. The security of the Pacific and the security of the Atlantic are thus functions of each other.

The Pacific undertakings represent a beginning in an attempt to do something quite novel in political experience—the organization of an extensive ocean area by bringing together the island elements and the appertinent lands not by conquest but by free cooperation.

This reflects a difference in requirements brought about in an air age, as distinguished from the preceding period when sea power was the only determining factor on oceans.

In the earlier stage it would have been necessary for a pacifying power only to control the narrows and to have outlying repair and fueling stations. With the coming of air power and the attendant requirement for protecting merchant marine and naval forces from air attack, the security of the ocean-going powers requires integrity of position in all the islands and on the margins that bear on the ocean area. The Atlantic experience bears this out. Once the air age entered, it became necessary to organize into the system of security the remoter North Atlantic positions which could be neglected in the time of sea power alone. It becomes necessary to insure the presence of reliable governments of friendly disposition or, at least, the prevention of any of the areas concerned from coming under the influence of a potential enemy.

The program for the Pacific is complex because of the disparities among the political elements in the area.

It is not possible at this time to have a Pacific pact in the same sense as a North Atlantic Pact. In Europe, members of the North Atlantic Pact have, generally speaking, common problems, common outlooks, and complementary economies, and all have reached roughly similar levels of political, economic, and social development. That is not so in the other great ocean area. There we find countries ranging from crown colonies and satrapies such as Borneo to modern, industrialized Japan. Some of them, such as Japan and Thailand, have been independent for centuries. Others, like Indonesia, Burma, and the Philippines, have achieved full independence only in the last 6 years. Some of the countries of Asia still recognize the National Government of China as the only legitimate Chinese Government. Others recognize the Communist regime as the legitimate Government of China. Some, such as the Philippines, are willing to align themselves publicly on the side of the West. Other countries, particularly the newer ones such as Burma and Indonesia, see as their first task that of putting their own houses in order. They wish to be left alone to do so and do not wish to take sides in the world struggle at this time.

Another impeding factor is residual from World War II. There are still psychological reservations as to entering directly into mutual-security arrangements with Japan on the part of some of the peoples who suffered heavily and directly in consequence of Japan's ill-fated effort to organize the Pacific area by conquest. This must await time's healing.

What we have as of now is a set of separate mutual-security pacts schematically interlocked by the circumstance that the United States is a member of each. The other parties respectively are Japan, the Philippines, and in combination Australia and New Zealand.

When it was announced in April of 1951 that these treaties were to be concluded, President Truman described them as "initial steps" in the formation of an over-all security system for the Pacific. The United States looks forward to the time when the nations of the area will see their way clear to act in concert to insure their free development and to help each other maintain their independence. The United States will be ready and willing to play its part in helping them to do so. The initial steps already taken can be the foundation for this greater cooperation.

I have not attempted to deal with other areas where our strategic interests are great even though we have not brought them into the focus of commitments present or prospective—the Near and Middle East and the Asian subcontinent, for example.

What opportunities for building better foundations of security may materialize in any of these areas I shall not attempt to predict, recalling that it was only 5 years or so ago that we began afford-

ing assistance to the Greeks and the Turks without any commitment to them and that now they are solid elements in the pattern of our alliances as members of the North Atlantic Treaty. "Freedom," Matthew Arnold said, "is a good horse, but a horse to ride somewhere." Greece and Turkey rode it somewhere and others may do likewise. I hope this may be prophetic of what may occur in relation to the idea of a Middle East Command.

Let me now make some final observations from an American point of view.

Hub of Alliance Systems

The United States stands as the hub of all the systems of alliances designed to stand against the encroachments of the Communist-dominated land power whose imperium reaches across the upper range of the Eurasian land mass. If the United States were impaired in its security in any of the areas covered by its coalitions then, all in all, the other areas would suffer impairment of their security.

The United States stands in a peculiar geographic relationship to the rest of the world in lying in both the great land-mass hemispheres, in facing in great extent on both of the greatest water courses, the Atlantic and Pacific, and in stretching from the Arctic to the tropics.

We can get some idea of the linear scope of the United States by imagining that one extreme of its perimeter were superimposed at Tunisia and another at the Normandy Coast. If we then regard the United States as comprising the territory of its 48 component States, the range would extend upward to Oslo and then eastward to the Aral Sea. The United States includes more than the 48 component States. It reaches out to continental Alaska and the Aleutian chain. If we add these to the superimposition, the linear stretch northward will be from Tunisia to Spitzbergen and eastward from the Normandy Coast to Vladivostok.

From such a range in such a position we get perhaps a peculiar sense of the oneness of the general strategic problem. Security-wise there are no quadrants. Necessarily our problems of supply and planning and political initiatives must be conceived in relation to special areas, but we must not let the nomenclature of administrative convenience mislead us into thinking that the world is districted in respect to the fundamental problems of security. Many Americans still talk about

the problems of the Pacific and the Atlantic as if the Mercator projection gave a realistic picture of the world. Some Americans still fall into the habits of a departed day by referring to the American area as "this Hemisphere"—just as if East and West were separable. Fundamentally, however, we see the problem of the confrontation with Soviet-controlled power as all of a piece.

Unlike previous periods in the experience of nations, there are no reserve areas, no strategic backwaters, no buffers, no margins for error. The policy of security is no longer an exercise in geometry, dividing the world into districts. It is an exercise in integral calculus, with continuous interaction among all the factors and all the areas of concern. This is what we learned in that moment of truth when the attack on Korea was launched and we faced up to the circumstance that a default, a supine acceptance of the aggression, would reverberate through the structure of security and weaken it throughout the world.

As the Nation in the pivotal position in these coalitions, as the one with the greatest resources and the one therefore thrust by circumstances into a certain preeminence, we are keenly and continuously aware of our responsibilities in a leadership new to us in a situation new to history.

The abandonment of isolation is full and final. We try to face the new exigencies in the spirit of some prophetic lines of Walt Whitman:

Sail, sail thy best,
Ship of Democracy.
Of value is thy freight,
Tis not the Present only,
The Past is also stored in thee,
Thou holdest not the venture of
thyself alone,
Not of the Western continent alone,
Earth's résumé entire floats on thy keel
O ship, is steadied by thy spars,
With thee Time voyages in trust,
The antecedent nations sink or swim with thee,
With all their ancient struggles, martyrs,
heroes, epics, wars, thou bear'st
the other continents,
Theirs, theirs as much as thine,
The destination-port triumphant;
Steer then with good strong hand and wary eye
O helmsman, thou carriest great companions. . . .

•Mr. Marshall is a member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State. Part I of this article, which is from an address made before the NATO Defense College at Paris on Oct. 20 and 22, appeared in the BULLETIN of Nov. 17, 1952, p. 767.

Collective Defense Efforts To Safeguard Freedom

ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR ANDERSON¹

I am home for only a few days. Tomorrow I go back to my job in Europe.

While in the United States I feel I would be doing less than my duty if I did not try strongly to point out the grave dangers which lie ahead of the free world—sly, subtle dangers which the recent Congress of Moscow² has clearly and plainly blueprinted for us.

The recent speeches of Stalin, Malenkov, and Bulganin in Moscow were a clear, warning bell of their intentions to lull, divide, discourage, embitter, and conquer the alliance of free nations opposing Soviet aims.

You, Gentlemen, are writers, molders of public opinion. I am particularly glad that I can say what I have to say today to you.

The free world is entering a period more difficult and potentially more dangerous than any it has known since the early years of the last war. The West is gaining steadily in military strength. But the danger that our political, moral, and economic defenses may be breached in the period ahead is increasing. And as our military commanders insistently point out, military defenses cannot possibly hold if our political, moral, and economic defenses yield.

The danger that confronts us does not offer itself in the form of a dramatic crisis. We free people know how to rally around in a crisis, and we have had many crises in recent years. In 1947 the economies of many countries of Europe were in a state of virtual collapse—and communism was mounting rapidly. The answer there was the Marshall Plan. There arose the danger of Soviet seizure of control of the countries of Europe, one by one, either by invasion or subversion. The answers there were the Atlantic Pact and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. In 1950 there was no alternative to meeting aggression in

Korea with force and to rearming in the West.

In these cases the gravity of the crisis was evident, the compulsions to counteractions were tremendous, and the solutions themselves clear-cut in conception.

The danger that confronts us in the period ahead, however, is wholly different in nature. It is not a crisis, and it therefore arouses no powerful compulsion to counteraction. Moreover, the danger is such that solutions cannot be simple. They must be complex and sustained over a long period. They require extraordinarily constructive leadership and a high degree of public understanding and response. Moreover, they require international cooperation and organization far beyond that which exists today. The job of defense we have before us is therefore more difficult than any that has yet confronted the free peoples of the world.

The Soviet Blueprint

We do have one big advantage. We know the dimensions and character of the danger. It has been blueprinted for us and publicly exhibited in Moscow. We know directly from Stalin, Malenkov, and others of the Soviet oligarchy the assumptions upon which the Kremlin plots our destruction and tactics they prepare to employ against us. It is high time that we examine this blueprint and plan our defenses accordingly.

The basic reasoning of the Kremlin is this:

First, the men in Moscow are persuaded that the Soviet world, extending from the Elbe to the China Sea, is much better able to play a waiting game than the free world. The Soviet economy is largely self-sufficient. It is held in a tight, enforced unity by the very nature of the Soviet political system. It needs time to consolidate its position, expand its industrial base, and increase its military strength, while at the same time improving morale by modest increases in living standards.

Secondly, in the eyes of the Kremlin the Atlantic alliance is in a far weaker position to withstand a long period of strenuous alertness. The all-

¹ Made before the Overseas Writers Club at Washington Nov. 10 (press release 869). Ambassador Anderson is deputy U.S. special representative in Europe.

² The 19th Soviet Communist Party Congress, which convened on Oct. 5 and adjourned on Oct. 14.

embracing world market on which capitalist countries of the West formerly depended is now divided, with a large part under Soviet control. The West has not made and cannot make, the Russians think, an adjustment to this situation. The Marshall Plan, the war in Korea, and rearmament have been, in their view, an effort at economic and military defense which cannot be sustained. The application of Western capital and skill to world resources, they believe, will not expand in the years ahead and markets may well contract. The Soviet world will do its part to disrupt by dumping its own surpluses here and there. Idleness and depression in the West will, they hope, become chronic.

Thirdly, the Kremlin is convinced that increasing poverty, tension, and scrambling for markets and raw materials will bring the capitalist countries of the West, and especially France and Great Britain, to break away from the Atlantic alliance and even enter open conflict with us to secure, as Stalin puts it, once more an independent position and, in his words, "of course high profits." Likewise, he predicts Japan and Germany will rise to their feet, break with the United States, and embark upon a course of nationalistic competitive development.

These, then, are the Soviet assumptions. And from these assumptions an explicit Soviet strategy has emerged as blueprinted by the recent Moscow Congress. It comprises first and foremost relaxing pressure on the European members of the Atlantic alliance by easing fears of invasion, by abandoning direct and uncouth methods of internal subversion, by stressing to Europe the possibilities and blessings of—in Soviet words—"peaceful co-existence." This relaxation of pressure, it is calculated, will make the comfort-loving peoples of the West question and largely deny the need for rearmament and for making the sacrifices necessary to develop those new forms of political, economic, and military unity that might enable Western peoples to solve their problems and grow in strength.

Meanwhile, the tremendous power of the U.S.S.R., including its world-wide Communist organization, will be deployed to promote division, suspicion, and mistrust among members of the Atlantic alliance. There will be propaganda appeals to fears, to hatreds, and to nationalism to stem the growing movement toward European unity. There will be full-scale mobilization of anti-American feeling to check the growing unity of the Atlantic community. Economic warfare will be waged in an attempt to cause deterioration of the West.

Through these methods, the Soviet leaders hope to keep the West divided, quarrelsome, nationalistic, and weak while they use their totalitarian power to make the U.S.S.R. increasingly strong, both militarily and economically. And in the end they expect to take us over. They have not aban-

doned their implacable hostility to capitalism, nor have they renounced aggressive war as a means if the necessity or a good opportunity should arise. As Bulganin told the Moscow Congress, the Soviet machine can be very quickly converted to the needs of war.

Reasons for Changed Tactics

Why has this change in Soviet tactics come about?

It has come about partly, I think, because of the success the Western Allies have been having, under the pressure of immediate danger, in organizing the political, economic, and moral strength of free Europe and the Atlantic community. It has come about partly because the Soviet Union and its satellites need a breathing period. They probably figure, for example, that in the production of atomic weapons they can, with time, narrow the gap between U.S. and Soviet atomic power.

But I am very strongly convinced that the shift in Soviet tactics proceeds in very large part from a shrewd analysis of the extremely difficult problems confronting Europe, the Atlantic community, and the free world and from a genuine Kremlin conclusion that if Soviet-Communist pressure is apparently relaxed we of the free world will not continue to do what is necessary to save ourselves.

There is a lot of Marxist nonsense and dialectical rubbish in what Stalin and Company have been saying to the faithful in Moscow; but there is also a great deal of penetrating insight. We of the West shall be guilty of gross neglect if we do not examine our weaknesses in the light of the Soviet analysis, discover which are real and which are false, and develop a plan of action on whatever scale is required to remedy them.

What are those weaknesses?

Consider first the extreme difficulties that democracies face in building and maintaining a high level of armed preparedness in time of peace. This will continue to be for us a primary task, the main guarantee of our defense, the main buttress of our policy. The Soviet dictatorship continues year after year to devote a high percentage of the national product to armies and armaments. But in our democracies, military budgets must be voted each year by representatives of the people according to their estimate not only of the danger itself but of their own political position. Democracies in modern history have seldom maintained costly defenses for long periods in time of peace. If we are to succeed now we must find means, compatible with our democratic processes, whereby peoples can be kept in a state of informed alertness.

The problem is even more complicated by the fact that a large number of free countries are concerned. Varying national estimates of the danger and of the sacrifices required for defense leave the door open to mutual recriminations and

suspicions. Some countries may feel that others are not doing their share, and this may lead to a competitive diminution in effort. This in turn would lead to a weakening of the alliance.

It is of the greatest importance that we recognize our own difficulties, as democracies, in maintaining a state of preparedness and take special steps to overcome them. Remedies will probably include a great deal more public, official analysis and debate of our common danger and a great stepping-up of the public-information effort.

Consider also the economic problems of the Atlantic community and of the free world. The dropping of the Soviet Iron Curtain around a large part of the world is a serious economic blow to the free world, and it would be foolish not to admit it. It is a serious blow to Western Europe which in modern times has depended to an important degree upon a thriving trade with China. It is a serious blow to the whole free world that has depended upon a world market. This is not to say that we cannot redirect our trade, that we cannot promote development in other regions of the earth, that we cannot intensify production and productivity in our homelands—that we cannot in these ways overcome our losses. But it does mean that we have got to face the problem frankly in its largest proportions and organize the tremendous effort required to build at home and around the world new sources for raw materials and new markets for products.

Need for Steady Economic Expansion

Nor does it mean that the loss of Western markets and Western sources of raw material does not raise similar difficulties for the Soviet world. But the Kremlin is confident that it can in the years ahead continue to expand its industrial base and provide for increasing armaments and also for slowly rising standards of living. We in the United States have no real fear that we cannot continue our own economic expansion here at home. But we have got to face the fact that economic expansion in Europe has been slowing down after several years of impressive postwar recovery. We must recognize that economic expansion throughout most of the free world is proceeding at too slow a pace due to many factors, including a lack of investment capital. A continued growth of the disparity between rates of expansion and productivity in Europe and the United States would subject the Atlantic alliance to steadily increasing strain between the dollar and nondollar areas of the free world. Moreover, failing steady economic expansion, the whole free world will remain vulnerable to Communist lures, encroachments, and propaganda.

Here again there are things that can and must be done if we are not to fall into the Soviet trap. Europe can do many things to increase productivity, to integrate its economy, and thereby create

a market that is wide and deep and infinitely expandable. The United States can do many things to open up its own market to increased trade and to organize a flow of U.S. capital around the world large enough to provide a foundation for a thriving free-world economy. The free-world economy as we have known it for well over a hundred and fifty years has never functioned without a large and continuous flow of private capital and technical skills. Today, private capital is going abroad only in trickles. This at a time when the security of the free world requires a large and steady economic expansion. It is clear that all possible steps must be taken to encourage private capital to underwrite the economic expansion of the free world. If private capital is to do the job, more encouragement must be given by the areas needing investment, and profit possibilities must be found, explored, and emphasized. Our own and European governments may have to offer guarantees against some of the political risks involved. On both sides of the Atlantic it is time that we stop just talking about these problems and do something about them.

I think the Soviet leaders have very shrewdly and accurately calculated that the unity that has grown in Europe and in the Atlantic community in the last few years has occurred within the context of large scale U.S.A. aid to Europe that has relieved Europe's chronic balance-of-payments difficulties. I think they are aware that the whole policy and practice of large U.S. annual grants-in-aid to Europe is wearing thin. They know that the U.S. Congress has grown more and more reluctant to vote annual grants-in-aid and that the countries of Europe increasingly find dependence upon American grants unsatisfactory. They know, just as we know, that we have not yet built new economic relationships within the Atlantic community and between the Atlantic community and the rest of the free world that are self-sustaining and businesslike. This requires tremendous initiative and tremendous effort. We can overcome our weaknesses. But we must first recognize them and then act boldly and promptly.

Consider next the political relations between the members of the Atlantic community. We have developed an alliance which thus far is predominantly military in character. We have built and progressed well with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But NATO has a great undeveloped potential. The extremely complex problems that arise between various members of the alliance are dealt with largely on a bilateral basis. The dangers of this situation have become evident in the past weeks. It is intolerable, for example, both to the United States and to Europeans that family discussions between us as to the level and kind of armaments and aid should develop into a mistaken feeling on the part of people in any country that they are being coerced by a stronger ally. This is

just what Stalin and Company would gleefully welcome and just what they would exploit to the fullest.

There is a defense against this danger, but we must build it. We must strengthen the NAT Organization itself. We must develop a more effective international staff. In the forum of the NATO Council of Permanent Representatives we must arrive at more decisions on a NATO basis, de-emphasizing these delicate problems in the bilateral field.

Increased Unification Necessary

Finally, the growing unity of Europe and of the Atlantic community must continue. Ambassador Draper pointed out a few weeks ago that a unified Europe is essential to the strength of the Atlantic community, just as the Atlantic coalition is essential to the defense and well-being of Europe.³ Just now the projects of unification are running into stormy weather. Old fears and old nationalisms are being revived. They are being picked up and amplified by Communist propaganda. Doubting Thomases bob up to question and worry. They always have; they always will.

Actually, what the European community of six and the NATO community of fourteen have accomplished in the last few years has really given pause to the Kremlin. The leaders of the Soviet Union could hardly have expected the countries of continental Europe to seriously consider merging their sovereignties into a stronger whole. Nor could they think, 5 short years ago, that not only Great Britain but far-away Canada and the United States as well would join Western Europe in the wider framework of an Atlantic organization dedicated to political and military defense.

The men of the West who are working for this goal of unification and strength may occasionally get discouraged and weary, but they do not doubt their eventual success.

They have only to look at the great progress which has already been made. In terms of history, Europe in the past few short years has taken strides along the road to unification which in the past must have been counted in terms of centuries.

I have seen at first hand the work of the councils of the Schuman Plan, of the European Defense Community, and of the Council of Europe. The leaders of these groups are sincere statesmen who believe honestly that an allied and unified Europe is not only necessary but inevitable—a product of political and historical evolution which a few men may hinder but no man can stop. I think the great majority of the peoples believe it is both necessary and inevitable. I believe that too.

Together we of the West have come far on the

road to peace and security. To allow ourselves to falter now—or to fall prey to those who would divide and embitter us—is unthinkable.

ADDRESS BY GENERAL RIDGWAY⁴

[Excerpts]

On my arrival in Europe nearly 5 months ago, I found the solid foundation [of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's military forces] laid by General Eisenhower, Field Marshal Montgomery, Marshal Juin, Air Chief Marshal Saunders, Admiral Lemonnier, General Gruenther, and countless others, in uniform and out. An integrated staff of highly selected officers representing the 14 nations of NATO was functioning smoothly despite the difficulties of different languages and cultural backgrounds. The first phases of organization and planning had been accomplished. There were armed forces in being to serve notice on any potential aggressor that we of the free world intended to defend to the utmost our lands and our liberties. Although our forces today are far stronger than they were 2 years ago, and have been greatly augmented by Greece and Turkey, we are still far from the minimum we need to deal with an all-out surprise attack. These forces are, however, more than a symbol of our strength. They could today, if attacked, make the path of an aggressor both difficult and costly.

These 14 nations of the free Western world have banded together in a collective effort to resist aggression from whatever direction it may come and whether from without or from within.

The issue is clear. Either we exist as God-fearing, free, and self-respecting peoples, or we succumb to slavery and the doom of a dead existence in a Godless world.

Only through strength—properly planned and directed strength—can our objective be achieved. History shows that brute force has contempt for the weak and respects only the strong. The world should ever remember however that free-world strength is for the sole purpose of deterring, or if need be, defeating aggression. Our armies, navies, and air forces will never be used as an aggressive weapon for assaulting peoples who keep the peace. These forces are solely for use in our own self-defense.

The later light of history will show that following World War II, every human effort was made by the democracies to live in harmony with their neighbors and that they were ever ready to promote the good and further the dignity of free men in peaceful pursuits. Only when these efforts proved fruitless did these free countries bind themselves together for self-defense.

³ For text of the address made on Oct. 20 by Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr., U.S. special representative in Europe, see BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1952, p. 650.

⁴ Made before the Pilgrims' Dinner at London on Oct. 14 and released to the press by the Public Information Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, on the same date.

In the short time of my command of these NATO forces, I have called on the governmental and military leaders of most of the member nations. In many cases I have visited their forces in the field to observe their morale, training, and equipment. What I have learned has been heartening. The leaders and the men themselves understand our mission. They will do their utmost to help fulfill it. Yet probably most important of all is the extent to which the civilian populations realize our aims and are contributing their share to the effort. In some cases this spirit is superb.

It is, however, apparent that high taxation can easily become a cause for discord among people if they do not understand the reasons for it. Therefore, it seems to me imperative that every citizen should be fully informed by his own government of the necessity we are under, for reasons beyond our control, for devoting so large a part of national budgets to military establishments.

Each Must Contribute Full Share

My staff and principal commanders fully recognize the basic importance of the relation of national economic capability to collective military requirements. They fully recognize that the maintenance of a viable economy definitely limits the military strength, active and reserve, which any particular nation can maintain. They see as clearly as any that, if the economic floor falls, the military structure resting on that floor is sure to be damaged, perhaps seriously weakened, and the attainment of our common objective—the preservation of our freedom by peaceful means—jeopardized.

At the same time, it must, I think, be recognized that each country is responsible for contributing its full share within its economic capability. The price of freedom assumes a quite different value if the alternative to paying that price is slavery. For us, freedom is no luxury item to be dispensed with because its cost is high. It is an essential element of life. If our sense of values should ignore these facts, we would indeed be on the downward path.

As the French Minister of Defense, Monsieur Plevin, recently stated: "Whatever the price of national defense may be, it is always lower than that of a prolonged war or, worse still, defeat."

There is only one catastrophe which could befall us greater than another world war and that would be the loss of our liberties. We are striving with sober and earnest determination to avert both catastrophes. We believe our best hope for doing so lies in having the strength to command respect in council, to avoid political blackmail, and to deter open aggression.

Measured in pounds sterling or any other monetary unit, that cost will be high. Measured in spiritual values, it is acceptable, however high. Only with this strength can we have any confi-

dence that these dire misfortunes, whether begun by accident or by design, might not engulf us.

It is the indisputable responsibility of the civil authorities of each member state to decide how much of our collective military requirements its economy can support. It is likewise, I believe, the unquestioned responsibility of the military to furnish the civil authorities with a reasoned estimate of what minimum military strength is required.

It is not, I submit, for the NATO commanders to take stock of the economic factors and then to assess military requirements based on their views of economic capabilities. Such an assessment would be beyond their competence and a departure from their fundamental responsibility. That responsibility is to evaluate the threat to our security from the professional military viewpoint, and, from the same viewpoint, to recommend the minimum forces believed essential successfully to meet that threat should it ever materialize.

This has been done. It is not a static evaluation. It is under continuing review, as the many major variables in this exceedingly complex equation change. It is under intensive scrutiny now, to determine its honest, accurate objectivity.

This assessment is concerned with more than just the creation of minimum military forces. It is concerned with their maintenance for as long as the need may continue. Above all it is concerned, and vitally so, with their creation in the shortest practicable time.

Time Factor All-Important

It is this factor of time—this inextensible, incompressible, intangible element—that demands our most thoughtful consideration. For plans to build our defensive strength, however well conceived, would be sheer wasted effort, if action in implementing them were to be overlong deferred.

We have yet to reach our minimum military requirements. Until we do, military commanders cannot accept responsibility for lessened effort or reduced goals. They must face the fact that the potential aggressor is capable of moving at any time of his choosing in strength much greater than today we can muster. We have no information which would lead us to believe that this strength has in any way diminished. On the contrary, our information indicates it has definitely grown and continues to grow.

It is for the statesman to estimate Kremlin intentions. It is for the civil authorities to accept responsibility for acting in accordance with such estimate. It is for the military properly to inform the civil authorities of the consequences, as the military sees such consequences, of basing action on estimates of intentions.

As military men we shall continue to base our recommendations on consideration of the capabilities of those who might attack us. We know those

capabilities to be great. For the safety of our peoples and their lands, we feel that we must build minimum military strength with the greatest practicable speed. At the same time, we feel most earnestly that our peoples by every means at their disposal must, by well-planned programs, convey to all the world the truthful nature of our stated purpose—to make attack upon us unprofitable, to preserve the peace and our continued free existence in a world at peace.

NATO's Basic Military Concept

Our basic concept as to how to do this does not call for huge standing forces, the maintenance of which might jeopardize other basic objectives—the economic stability and the raising of the standard of living. Rather, our concept calls for an adequate though small covering force of land, sea, and air, always on guard, capable of meeting any sudden onslaught and of parrying any potentially disastrous or decisive thrusts. Backing up this “ever-ready” active component we must have rapidly mobilizable, well-trained, and well-equipped reserves. Furthermore, these reserves must be capable of rapid commitment to relieve the heavy pressure which will inevitably be brought to bear upon the covering force and to provide the depth in which we can slow down the momentum of the hostile assault and eventually bring it to a halt. Reserves which could only be committed to battle after we had been conquered would be of little use.

Finally, and it is this element of our basic concept which gives me acute concern, both our active and reserve components must have essential supporting facilities and supplies in adequate quantity, ready in the proper areas by the time required. Courage and skill cannot defend against well-trained forces adequately armed and equipped. A man's bare hands cannot compete with a tommy gun or tank. Post-hostilities recriminations could not restore lives and limbs lost through careless gambling with our fate.

I wish to emphasize again the overriding importance, if we in the military are to accomplish the mission the civil authorities have assigned us, of the timely attainment of minimum requirements in active and reserve forces and in the means for adequately supplying and sustaining both.

Our active forces must always be ready. Our first-line reserve forces must be brought quickly to such level of training as will warrant commitment to action with little or no additional training after an emergency develops. Our supply and service capabilities must at all times be prepared to function on call and to continue functioning effectively despite all the grave dislocations which the full impact of hostilities would inevitably bring.

The basic concept just stated involves another important point—the need for the participation of

German forces in our collective effort, as it would be essential to reinforce the covering forces at the earliest possible moment so the availability of German ground units already located well forward would obviously be a great asset. Moreover, German participation would permit our defending further to the east and thus better provide for the common defense of all of Western Europe, Germany included.

You know, I am sure, that participation of armed forces of the German Federal Republic in our collective defense effort awaits ratification by the six member governments of the European Defense Community. With ratification, the initiative and imagination of French statesmanship will have carried Western Europe another long step toward unity. Western Germany and its 50 million people will then be in a position to share in both the benefits and the responsibilities of our great collective effort to safeguard our freedom.

In conclusion, permit me to reiterate the fact that in NATO we have made real progress in which every man and woman who is helping to carry these great burdens can take solid satisfaction. We still have, however, a long hard road to travel to reach our goal.

It has been and continues to be a challenging task. It is one to which we can in sober pride devote our finest efforts. It will be, when accomplished, enduring evidence of our integrity, our vision, and our courage.

Let us pray for the faith that moveth mountains and in that faith, with all possible speed, let us accomplish, as I know we can, the great task at hand, leaving to our descendants a monument they will be proud to preserve.

Vienna “Peace Congress”

Press release 870 dated November 13

The Department of State has received requests for information from Americans who have been asked to attend a so-called “Congress of the Peoples for Peace” to be held at Vienna on December 12, 1952.

Permission to hold this “Congress” was never asked of the Austrian Government, which, on November 4, officially termed it a Communist propaganda maneuver.

The truth of this is evident in the light of the fact that behind the scenes the Congress is being staged by the Communist high command which has taken the trouble to import one of its prize propagandists, Ilya Ehrenburg, from Moscow to Vienna for this show.

The true purpose of this uninvited, unwanted Congress is completely exposed by Stalin's recent call to the Communist Parties outside of the Soviet Union to promote “popular front” activities. The Congress has but one objective: to serve the Soviet policy of underwriting aggression while holding “Peace Congresses.”

U.S. Again Asks U.S.S.R. To Return Lend-Lease Vessels

Press release 859 dated November 5

Following is the text of a note addressed by Acting Secretary Bruce to Soviet Ambassador Georgi N. Zarubin and delivered to the Soviet Embassy at Washington on November 5, and the text of a note dated June 16 from the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, Boris I. Karavaev, to Secretary Acheson:

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE OF NOVEMBER 5

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to Mr. Karavaev's note No. 44 of June 16, 1952 concerning the negotiations for a settlement of the obligations of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942.¹

In his note of June 16, 1952, Mr. Karavaev expressed the readiness of the Soviet Government to return to the United States 186 naval craft, the return of which the Government of the United States initially requested in its note of September 3, 1948 and has repeatedly requested since that time. On June 18, 1952, United States lend-lease representatives in a meeting with the Soviet lend-lease delegation proposed the immediate establishment of a working group to arrange the details of the return of these vessels. The Soviet delegation, however, was unwilling to agree to the establishment of such a working group or otherwise to arrange for the return of the vessels. Thus, the Soviet Government, although formally professing its readiness to return these vessels, has not been prepared to take concrete action for this purpose. If it is in fact the intention of the Soviet Government to return these vessels, the Government of the United States desires that it be informed, without further delay, of the dates and ports of return, or alternatively of the date when Soviet representatives will be available to work out with representatives of the Government of the United States the details for the return of the vessels.

¹ For summary of these negotiations, see BULLETIN of June 2, 1952, p. 879.

Mr. Karavaev's note also reiterates the desire of the Soviet Government to purchase lend-lease merchant vessels and certain of the lend-lease naval craft now in its custody. The Government of the United States had made its position with respect to lend-lease vessels clear in its notes of April 6, 1951² and January 7, 1952³ and in meetings of the lend-lease delegations of our two Governments since January 1951. The offers of the Government of the United States early in the settlement negotiations to sell lend-lease merchant vessels and a number of lend-lease naval vessels were expressly conditioned upon the prompt conclusion of a satisfactory over-all lend-lease settlement. When it became unmistakably clear that the Soviet Government did not intend to conclude a settlement promptly, the Government of the United States in January 1951 withdrew these offers and requested the return of all lend-lease vessels.

That the Soviet Government has consistently avoided the conclusion of a prompt settlement is fully documented in the history of the negotiations. A particular example of the attitude of the Soviet Government toward the prompt conclusion of a settlement is its failure to return the 186 vessels which were requested by the Government of the United States over four years ago and were never offered for sale. This attitude is further exemplified by the refusal of the Soviet Government to resolve the question of a financial settlement through arbitration as proposed by the Government of the United States in its note of April 27, 1951⁴ and also by the refusal of the Soviet Government to submit the question of the return of lend-lease vessels to the International Court of Justice for adjudication, as proposed by the Government of the United States in its note of January 7, 1952.

Since the Soviet Government has not only failed to return the vessels but also has refused to submit the matter to adjudication, the Government of the United States must conclude that it is the

² BULLETIN of Apr. 23, 1951, p. 646.

³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1952, p. 86.

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 7, 1951, p. 744.

intention of the Soviet Government to remain in default of Article V of the Agreement of June 11, 1942.

As regards the question of a financial settlement which is also mentioned in Mr. Karavaev's note, the Government of the United States has offered to accept the sum of \$800 million which it considers fair and reasonable compensation for the vast quantities of civilian-type lend-lease articles remaining in Soviet custody at the end of hostilities. However, in the interests of achieving a settlement promptly, this Government offered to reduce further the amount requested provided a truly constructive offer was made by the Soviet side. The Government of the United States, in its note of January 7, 1952, has already stated that it considers the latest offer of the Soviet Government of \$300 million as far from fair and reasonable compensation for the residual lend-lease articles. Furthermore, the Government of the United States must take into account the fact that by not returning the 186 naval craft and other vessels requested, the Soviet Government is in clear default of the very agreement under which negotiations of a lend-lease settlement have been carried on since April 1947. It is the position of the Government of the United States, therefore, that when the Soviet Government has made arrangements to fulfill its obligations under Article V of the Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, the Government of the United States in the interest of a settlement will be prepared to make further proposals concerning a financial settlement.

If it is the serious intention of the Soviet Government to advance the conclusion of a mutually satisfactory settlement agreement, it can do so by returning the lend-lease vessels promptly.

Accept [etc.]

DAVID BRUCE

TEXT OF SOVIET NOTE OF JUNE 16

No. 44

SIR: In connection with your note of January 7, 1952, concerning the settlement of lend-lease accounts, I have the honor to state the following.

The Soviet Government in its previous notes has already shown that scrupulous observance of the agreement achieved earlier is a necessary condition for reaching a general and a mutually satisfactory settlement of lend-lease accounts. Non-observance of this condition cannot but cause delays in the settlement of the entire question of lend-lease accounts.

As is known, on the question of lend-lease vessels the Governments of the USSR and the USA earlier reached an agreement setting forth that the United States agreed to the sale to the Soviet Union of the merchant vessels and a certain number of the

naval vessels. In this connection it was intended that the experts of both sides should discuss the question both of the terms of sale of the above-mentioned vessels and of the procedure and dates of the return of the remaining vessels. Later on, the Government of the United States, deviating from the previously achieved agreement, refused to discuss the question of the sale of the merchant vessels and a part of the naval vessels, insisting on the return both of all merchant vessels and of the naval vessels delivered to the Soviet Union under lend-lease. Refusing to fulfill the agreement reached earlier, the Government of the USA thereby impedes the achievement of agreement on the general settlement of lend-lease accounts, to which fact the Soviet Government considered it necessary to call the attention of the Government of the USA in its note of August 21, 1951.⁵

The Government of the USA seeks to justify its refusal to sell to the Soviet Union the vessels regarding which an agreement has already been reached between the Governments of the USA and the USSR by references to the fact that the agreement was conditional on "prompt achievement of a mutually satisfactory over-all lend-lease settlement" and that this condition allegedly was not fulfilled by the Soviet Government. Such an assertion of the Government of the USA is groundless, because the Soviet Government for its part took a series of measures toward the most rapid settlement of the lend-lease question.

It is known that the Soviet Government made substantial concessions and introduced several constructive proposals which created the possibility of a successful completion of the negotiations regarding the settlement of lend-lease accounts. For this purpose, the Soviet Government, in the course of the negotiations which were held, agreed to a considerable increase in the overall sum of compensation for residual lend-lease goods, and in particular on August 24, 1951, increased this amount of compensation from 240 million dollars to 300 million dollars, which constitutes an amount almost twice as great as the amount originally stipulated. It is also necessary to note that the amount of 300 million dollars represents a higher percentage of compensation than, for example, was the case in establishing the amount of compensation for lend-lease deliveries to Great Britain. Eight months has already passed since the introduction by the Soviet Government of the proposal to set the overall amount of compensation at 300 million dollars. However, the Government of the USA for its part has not named a lower amount of compensation than the previously stipulated sum of 800 million dollars, although in the course of the negotiations the representatives of the USA repeatedly declared their readiness to lower the amount of compensation named by the Government of the USA, if the Soviet Union would consent to an increase of the overall amount above 240 million dollars. It is

⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1952, p. 87.

sufficient, for example, to point out the statements made during the negotiations by Mr. Wiley on January 27, February 7, and March 7, 1951, and the statements of Mr. Reinhardt on August 21 and 24, 1951. It is necessary to note that although on August 24, 1951, Mr. Reinhardt promised to communicate at the next meeting the position of the Government of the USA regarding the amount of 300 million dollars proposed by the Soviet side, the American side has not yet designated the date of the next meeting. It follows from this that the delay in reaching a mutually acceptable settlement of lend-lease accounts is the result of the position taken by the Government of the United States.

In its note of January 7 of this year the Government of the United States asserts that the Soviet Government, in the note of August 21, 1951, allegedly stated that it did not intend to fulfill its obligation regarding the return of the lend-lease vessels. This assertion is also devoid of any foundation. The Soviet Government, as is known, has already returned to the United States 27 frigates, 3 icebreakers, 7 tankers and 1 dry cargo vessel, which the Government of the USA did not desire to sell to the Soviet Union. As to the 186 naval vessels which the Government of the USA requests be returned, the Soviet Government has not de-

clared its refusal to satisfy this request either in its note of August 21, 1951 or any previous time. The Soviet Government expresses its readiness to return to the United States the 186 vessels indicated. After appropriate preparation this transfer could be begun in four or five months at foreign ports nearest the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviet Government expects that also the Government of the USA will carry out the agreement already reached regarding the sale to the Soviet Union of merchant vessels and a part of the remaining naval vessels from the number suitable for use.

As to the proposal of the Government of the USA to submit the question of lend-lease vessels to the consideration of an international court, the Soviet Government cannot agree to such a proposal for the same reasons for which it could not agree to the submission of the question of compensation for residual lend-lease goods in the USSR to the decision of a court of arbitration, which reasons were set forth in the Soviet Government's note of August 28, 1951.⁶

Accept [etc.]

B. KARAVAEV

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

New Information on Forced Labor in U.S.S.R.

Press release 862 dated November 7

New information on conditions in Soviet forced-labor camps as recent as May 1952 was made public on November 9 when the U.S. Government presented to the U.N. *Ad Hoc* Committee on Forced Labor at Geneva additional material on Soviet forced-labor practices.

As revealed by Walter M. Kotschnig, deputy representative of the United States in the Economic and Social Council, the new material covers practically the entire history of Soviet forced labor and for the first time gives evidence on very recent conditions. This supplements earlier material offered to the *Ad Hoc* Committee by the U.S. Government on June 27, 1952.¹

The entire new documentation was presented in two parts. Part I consists of affidavits and depositions of 105 persons, buttressed in a number of cases by official Soviet documents. Most of these witnesses are former Soviet citizens; the others

were sent to forced-labor camps while living in the U.S.S.R. as foreigners. Their experiences offer a comprehensive review of Soviet forced-labor methods from 1924 until 1947.

This evidence was obtained from questionnaires filled out by former inmates and relates predominantly to the pre-1945 period. It provides further confirmation of Soviet police methods during the 1924 purges in the Caucasus, the liquidation of millions of peasants during the collectivization drive of the early 1930's, the 1936 and 1937 repressions which accompanied the famed Moscow trials, and the wholesale arrests for so-called "sabotage and counter-revolutionary activity" in 1941 shortly after the break with Hitler.

Part II is a collection of information which extends the evidence of large-scale forced labor in the U.S.S.R. into the current year. It was obtained from German military and civilian prisoners and a Soviet refugee with experience in or information about existing Soviet forced-labor camps. Their testimony makes it possible to bring the Soviet forced-labor record up to early 1952.

The information from the German prisoners

¹ BULLETIN of July 14, 1952, p. 70. A report based on the earlier material has since been printed (*Forced Labor in the Soviet Union*, Department of State publication 4716); an excerpt appeared in the BULLETIN of September 22, 1952, p. 428.

came out in detailed interviews covering their experiences in a number of regular Soviet concentration camps up until their release by Soviet authorities in May 1952 from the Kiev and Brest-Litovsk camps. Other facts, learned from the former Soviet citizen, relate to two forced-labor camps in the Astrakhan region of the U.S.S.R. as of May-June 1951.

An analysis of these studies reveals that in recent years there has apparently been some improvement in the conditions of those interned in the camps. This may be attributed to two factors. First, there is a continual conflict among Soviet forced-labor functionaries as to whether forced labor should be used for punishment and liquidation of "undesirable elements" or for the exploitation of apparently cheap prison labor. Since the Soviet economy is presently geared largely to war production, the exploitative factor would seem now to be dominant, requiring that the laborers be fed, clothed, and housed at a survival level. Second, the continued activity of the United Nations, certain of its specialized agencies, and organs of the free labor movement in investigating forced labor has focused world public opinion on Soviet forced-labor practices and may have induced Soviet police authorities to pursue a more cautious policy.

Despite these apparent improvements inside the barbed-wire enclosures, many of the brutal procedures and methods of the early purge days continue to be used by Soviet authorities in apprehending, sentencing, and transporting their victims to the forced labor camps.

Midnight arrests, baseless accusations, physical and psychological torture, confessions signed under duress, and transport, sometimes for thousands of miles, in overcrowded and unhygienic cattle cars are still part of the standard routine suffered by the unfortunates selected to work in the Soviet forced-labor battalions.

Typical of the practices still being employed in the U.S.S.R. are the methods described in the following excerpts selected from the testimony offered today by Mr. Kotschnig:

On circumstances of arrest

At 12:05 A.M. the house manager with an NKVD agent and guard came into my room, showing me an order for arrest and a search warrant. They looked at my papers and books, two of which the agent said I should have got rid of long ago. They searched the apartment until 7:00 A.M. examining the walls, beds, floor, ceiling and so forth. They asked me about the actors and artists of the Bolshoi Theatre. I told them I knew them in the line of duty. They then took me to Lubianka Prison by car. I took no belongings with me, for I was told that it was useless, that I would soon return.

On formal accusations made by Soviet officials

No accusation was presented to me. The authorities wanted to liquidate us, the peasants, and make state slaves of us. It was announced to me when I was sentenced that I was accused of being a "member of the White Eagle Union".

They did not have any grounds for my arrest. It was not a case of my having been guilty or not, but of the

liquidation of the peasantry as a class by means of collectivization. My father was in the Czar's army and a good farmer. They did not accuse me of anything definite, they just asked where my father had been in 1918.

Interrogation

I was sent to a cell called "the sack" where one could only stand upright. I do not remember how long I remained in the "sack" and I regained my senses when cold water was poured over me. Once I was undressed and wrapped in a wet sheet. They then beat me with rubber clubs, so that no bruises would show. Four persons took position in the corners of the narrow premises. I was pushed in the middle and they started beating me off towards one another like a ball.

The reaction of the public prosecutor to my answer that I had no knowledge of it (black marketeering in 1946) and that I could bring witnesses to prove it—was that he threatened me with hanging if I wouldn't tell the truth, and that he needed only people who could testify against me and not prove my innocence. I had to sign the record of my interrogation and, because I refused to do so, at first the public prosecutor pointed a pistol at me and said he would shoot me if I didn't give my signature. The interrogation lasted from 9:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M.

Trial

I do not even know when the trial was held, because I was tried by the troika of the NKVD.

The trial took place in the middle of August, 1947, and lasted about 20 minutes. The court was represented by one person, a Russian major, as judge, and there was a Russian civilian as audience. The judge was simultaneously entrusted with the functions of prosecutor.

Conditions of transport to camps

We got 400 grams of salt fish every two days, and 300 grams of bread daily. Sometimes we went two or three days without water. Usually they gave us one pail for 70 persons to scramble at. Whoever was quick got something to drink. Many did not drink at all.

The cars were overcrowded. In one freight car there were about 70 to 75 persons. It was impossible to count how many, since people were squeezed in. . . . There were three-storied plank beds. Sick, dead and healthy people were lying together.

The journey lasted about 21 days. We travelled in cattle-cars in which we were pressed together like herrings in a box. The conditions in general were as bad as could be imagined. There was neither heating nor light. A hole in the floor served as latrine. [1947]

Together with another 900 interned persons, we were loaded into cattle-cars. The journey lasted 3 months, and we didn't know what our destination was. The conditions were terrible. Except the first few days when we got up to 600 grams of fresh bread and sometimes potato soup, we got only dry bread, salted herrings and nothing to drink. Only occasionally could we have some water from the locomotive. [1947]

Release and after

Before my release, I had to sign a paper to the effect that I wouldn't speak to anybody, not even to my family, about what I had heard or seen in the forced labor camps. If I violated this order, I was told that I would be shot without any further charge or trial.

We had a couple of soldiers accompanying the transport who had to see that we shouldn't come into contact with the population. Nevertheless, as long as the Russian soldiers were not directly at our heels, we entered into conversation with the population. People in the Eastern zone (of Germany) were greatly astonished that there should still be Germans in Russia. They didn't know anything at all about "punishment camps" or "camps of silence", and at first didn't want to believe what we were telling them. [May, 1952]

The new material offered by Mr. Kotschnig shows that the Soviet system of forced labor embraces both Soviet citizens and persons drawn from the Soviet orbit. The system shows no signs of vanishing but has become an integral part of the Soviet economy.

Investigation of Kidnaping of Dr. Walter Linse

Telegraphic text

The following is a translation of a press statement made in Berlin on November 13 by Johannes Stumm, Police President of West Berlin, concerning the kidnaping of Dr. Walter Linse, a resident of the American sector:

A thorough and widespread investigation covering a period of 4 months following the kidnaping of Dr. Walter Linse has resulted in the identification of four East Berlin professional criminals who stand accused of assaulting and abducting Dr. Linse from in front of his home in West Berlin on July 8, 1952.

This sweeping inquiry, conducted by scores of Berlin's most skillful police officers, represents a combination of exhaustive effort, the study of hundreds of leads and the application of all modern police methods. The investigation has disclosed not only the names of the four principal kidnapers but also of 13 other hand-picked and professional outlaws and gangsters who played important roles in one of the most brazen and repugnant crimes in the history of Berlin.

The four East Berliners who had been convicted previously of charges of murder, burglaries, embezzlement, and safecracking are

Harry Liedtke, 22, whose most recent address is Berlin-Friedrichshain, Barnimstrasse 17;

Erwin Knispel, 50, who has many addresses in East Berlin;

Herbert Nowak, 27, whose most recent address was Berlin-Friedrichshain, Heidenfeldstrasse, near the Zentralviehhof;

Josef Dehnert, 22, who has changed his address frequently in East Berlin.

These four men are identified as part of a criminally organized and criminally subsidized ring of kidnapers approved, sponsored, and directed by the GDR Ministry for State Security which has become widely known as the dread Mss, which not only is modeled after the MGB, the Ministry of State Security of the Soviet Union, but is an integral, thriving organ of the Russian Police State.

The relentless investigation into the abduction of Dr. Linse from in front of his home in Gerichtsstrasse, Berlin-Lichterfelde, has disclosed the heinous methods which the Mss employs in organizing its syndicate of kidnapers. By the very nature of its criminal mission the Mss is com-

pelled to rely completely upon murderers, dope addicts, highly trained burglars and black market operators. The Mss's masters even enlist prostitutes of all ages to assist them in their outlawed operations in West Berlin.

The Mss, which has been established only for a relatively short time, adopted a system of recruitment which is not particularly new in the annals of crimes against decent and law-abiding citizens, but is definitely effective. For example, the Mss leaders visit criminals in their prison cells and make nefarious deals with them. It operates something like this: A gangster may be serving a sentence for murder, as in the case of Nowak, or for 18 separate cases of safecracking, burglary, and other felonies, as in the case of Knispel, will be approached by an Mss stooge who holds out a promise of a reduced sentence or freedom if the imprisoned criminal agrees to join the kidnapers club. Since these criminals are offered such fine opportunities their answers to these proposals are obvious.

Once these crooks and killers are let out of prison to perform even worse crimes, their files and records are invariably removed from the police and prosecuting attorney's files and sometimes destroyed. But sometimes they are retained by the Mss which holds these records as a club or threat over the heads of the criminal hirelings.

It was under this system that the four East Berlin bandits were directed to attack and kidnap Dr. Linse. The execution of the crime was well planned. The habits and movements of Dr. Linse were studied and reported in details. There were to be no mistakes, no margin for error. Every move, every plan, every step, every report, every observation made by the four principal kidnapers and their 13 accomplices, whose records are just as bad as their companions, constituted a major crime in themselves.

The kidnap ring even went so far as to stop a West Berlin taxicab driven by Wilhelm Woiziske, of Berlin-Kreuzberg, Ohlauerstrasse 26, with the purpose in mind of removing its KB license plate for transfer to an Mss sedan which was used in the actual kidnaping. The taxicab driver was actually kidnaped himself and locked up in the cellar of the Prenzlauer Berg police inspection at Schoenhauser Allee 23. After the assault and kidnaping of Dr. Linse had been successfully concluded, Woiziske was released and retrieved his taxicab.

The following is a review of the kidnaping as it actually happened on July 8, 1952:

At approximately 7:30 on the morning of the above date Dr. Linse emerged from his home. The kidnapers' car was parked on Gerichtsstrasse Nardrakestrasse. Liedtke and Dehnert stepped out of the kidnap car. Dehnert, who approached Dr. Linse as though to ask for a light, struck the jurist in the face with a sandbag blackjack while Liedtke held Linse from behind.

The two culprits then yanked Dr. Linse into the car and dashed off at high speed with Dr. Linse's feet protruding from one of the rear doors of the car. The driver of a delivery truck, parked nearby, saw the abduction and pursued the kidnap vehicle. One of the kidnapers threw several tetrahedral nails onto the street in a vain attempt to halt the pursuer. Nowak has been identified as the gangster who fired two shots at the pursuing vehicle, both of which struck the car but not the driver.

The kidnap car sped down Drakestrasse at 90 to 100 kilometers per hour. When the kidnap car crossed Karwendelstrasse the kidnapers pulled Dr. Linse's legs into the car and shut the door. At this point one of Dr. Linse's shoes fell to the pavement.

The fugitive car then crossed Teltow-Kanal and then turned down Giesendorferstrasse and Berlinerstrasse to Schwelmerstrasse and subsequently roared across the Soviet zone border where a zonal barrier had been raised to accommodate the kidnaper's vehicle.

The crime from beginning to end was witnessed by many Berliners. This crime, of which the Soviet authorities have repeatedly denied knowledge, was aided and abetted by the following 13 accomplices, all of whom have criminal records:

Paul Liebig, 38 to 42. This man, an official of the Mss, in charge of the *Unsichtbar-Gruppe Weinmeister* is the most mysterious character of the lot. It is not even known whether Liebig is his correct family name, since he is commonly known simply as "Paul."

Fritz Vahle, alias Paul Schmidt, aged 31, last known to have lived at Berlin-Mitte, Weinmeisterstr 10. He is assistant to Paul. He is also a drug addict and claims to be a physician. In 1946 he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to 3 years in prison in the British zone for illegally using the title "Dr." Later that same year Vahle was declared to be not completely sane and was committed to a Schleswig sanatorium for observation. He escaped May 20, 1947.

Hans Richard Joswig, alias Bauer, aged 30; a man of many addresses, the most recent of which was Berlin-Mitte, Lottumstrasse 13. Joswig, a professional criminal, is wanted for the theft of \$220 and DM 20 committed on August 18, 1950, in Berlin-Steglitz. Subsequently he was arrested by Soviet sector police and later released.

Else Joswig, wife of Hans Joswig, 25 to 26 years of age. Kurt Knoblauch, 22 to 23, formerly of Berlin-Mitte, Anklamerstrasse, another paid gangster known to have been held in the Dirksenstrasse prison in February 1950.

Sonja Ballentin, 23, who has relatives at Berlin-Friedrichshain, Rigaerstrasse. Sonja who has lived with Harry Liedtke at Barnimstrasse 18 is engaged to the criminal Liedtke.

Fritz London, 26, last known to reside at Berlin-Prenzlauer Berg, Immanuelkirchstrasse 24.

Walter Paerschke, personal data unknown but whose record shows an arrest more than 2 years ago by East

sector police in Berlin-Treptow for stealing an automobile, and a sentence to Barnimstrasse prison.

Wladimirowicz Feder, 40 to 45, last known address Berlin-Weissensee, Pistoriusstrasse.

Siegfried Benter, 26 to 27, of Berlin-Friedrichshain, Palisadenstr 4.

Leiser, first name unknown, 35, Berlin-Weissensee, Pistoriusstr.

Skrolek, first name unknown, 30 to 35, brother of Wladimirowicz Feder.

Schura, first name unknown, 35, address unknown.

The West Berlin police have unimpeachable evidence that this Mss-sponsored and protected kidnap organization is financed by the sale of great quantities of cigarettes, coffee, and silk stockings on the black market.

These then are the type of people, guarded and supported by the Soviet-controlled and dominated East Berlin, who assaulted and kidnaped Dr. Linse.

Death of President of Israel

Press release 866 dated November 10

The following messages of condolence were sent November 9 on the death of Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of Israel:

His Excellency

JOSEF SPRINZAK,
*Acting President of Israel,
Tel Aviv, Israel.*

The people of the United States join with me in extending to you and to the people of Israel our deepest sympathy on the passing of your beloved President, Chaim Weizmann.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

His Excellency

DAVID BEN GURION,
*Prime Minister of Israel,
Tel Aviv, Israel.*

Please accept my sincere condolences upon the death of President Weizmann. The news of his passing has been received by this Government and Americans throughout the country with deep sorrow. As a founder of his country, President Weizmann's courage and resolution were an inspiration to his people.

DEAN ACHESON
Secretary of State

Continuation of Economic Assistance to Yugoslavia

by James L. Colbert

By an exchange of letters dated October 13, 1952, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on the one hand and Yugoslavia on the other confirmed their understanding as to the basis on which tripartite economic aid to Yugoslavia will continue through the 12 months July 1952-June 1953. The assistance the three Governments have agreed to give is being provided to strengthen Yugoslavia's economy in order to increase its defense capabilities and preserve its independence from Soviet and satellite pressure. Although no sums were mentioned in the exchange of letters, the total tripartite contribution for the period July 1, 1952, to June 30, 1953, has been set at 99 million dollars, with the United States tentatively contributing 78 million dollars, the United Kingdom £4½ million (12.6 million dollars), and France 2,940 million francs (8.4 million dollars).

Pursuant to the agreement on the aid program, the Mutual Security Agency has made available 30 million dollars of the total amount in order that Yugoslavia may proceed with its efforts to remedy the critical economic situation caused by the 1952 drought. Since no aid had been made available for fiscal 1953, pending agreement on the program, reserves of raw materials were running low, with the result that a substantial portion of the U.S. allocation will be used to buy industrial raw materials. Wheat and fats will also be bought and shipped immediately to areas which suffered from the drought.

The arrangements for furnishing economic assistance to Yugoslavia were confirmed by the tripartite Governments in the Washington report signed on April 21, 1952. The three Governments incorporated certain portions of their agreement, which involved responsibilities on the part of Yugoslavia, in the diplomatic notes just exchanged. The notes call for internal efforts to achieve equilibrium in the Yugoslav balance of payments in the shortest time possible and, in view of uncertainty concerning the availability of

foreign exchange, the Yugoslavs have been asked to follow a system of priority criteria in planning their investment program. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is to be regarded insofar as possible as the source of future loans for the Yugoslav investment program.

The four Governments have agreed to exchange views regarding future loans for the Yugoslav investment program and have further agreed to consult together with a view to arriving at an effective means of achieving an amelioration in Yugoslavia's debt position. The four Governments recognize the importance of the industrial development of Yugoslavia, as well as an increase in its agricultural production, in assisting it to arrive at independence of outside assistance. The provisions regarding investment and debts are intended to assure the most effective use of U.S., U.K., and French assistance. The four Governments have also agreed to promote in the highest degree the provision of technical assistance to Yugoslavia.

Although the United States provided the major part of the large UNRRA program to Yugoslavia in 1945 and 1946, direct U.S. grant assistance to Yugoslavia is of recent origin. Following Tito's break with the Cominform in 1948, the United States found it advantageous for political and military reasons to assist Yugoslavia's efforts to resist Soviet pressures. In 1949 and 1950 the Export-Import Bank extended three loans, totaling 55 million dollars, to Yugoslavia. The United States, however, made no direct grant assistance available to Yugoslavia until the latter half of 1950. The drought of that year, combined with the disruption occasioned by the orientation of Yugoslavia's trade toward the West, mounting Yugoslav indebtedness, and the hostile pressures being exerted upon Yugoslavia by the Soviet bloc were situations deemed to be of serious importance to the United States and required aid.

With a view to preventing the suffering of the

Background on Aid to Yugoslavia

- Nov. 20, 21, 1950—Notes exchanged at Belgrade established the basis for MDA assistance to Yugoslavia (BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1950; p. 985).
- Nov. 24, 1950—The President notified the Congress that Mutual Defense Assistance funds would be used for food as part of an interim-aid program for Yugoslavia (BULLETIN of Dec. 4, 1950, p. 879).
- Nov. 29, 1950—The President requested emergency legislation to relieve the food shortage (BULLETIN of Dec. 11, 1950, p. 937).
- Dec. 29, 1950—The Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950 was approved (Public Law 897, 81st Cong.; text, BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1951, p. 277).
- Jan. 6, 1951—An agreement signed with Yugoslavia set forth the terms for providing food under the Emergency Relief Assistance Act (BULLETIN of Jan. 22, 1951, p. 150).
- Apr. 16, 1951—The President notified the Congress that MDA funds would be used for raw materials critically needed by Yugoslavia (BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 718).
- Apr. 18, 1951—A note to Yugoslavia stated the mutually agreed basis for the provision of raw materials (*ibid.*, p. 717).
- Nov. 7, 1951—The President notified the Congress that military and economic assistance would be furnished Yugoslavia under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1951, p. 826).
- Nov. 14, 1951—An agreement signed at Belgrade set forth the conditions governing military assistance to Yugoslavia under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (BULLETIN of Nov. 26, 1951, p. 863).
- Jan. 8, 1952—An economic cooperation agreement was signed at Belgrade setting forth the understandings as to U. S. economic and technical assistance to Yugoslavia (for text, see *Supplement to the First Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program*, p. 7).
- Feb. 5, 1952—The President notified the Congress that Mutual Security funds granted to Yugoslavia as well as to several other European countries would be transferred from military assistance to economic assistance (BULLETIN of Feb. 25, 1952, p. 317).

For a chronology covering the period June 1948–November 1950 entitled "Moves of Yugoslavia Away from the Kremlin Toward the West," see House Foreign Affairs Committee print, *Yugoslav Emergency Food Assistance Program*, dated Nov. 27, 1950, 81st Cong., 2d sess.

Yugoslav people, the Congress approved the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950, which, together with other funds made available to meet Yugoslavia's food needs, resulted in the extension of approximately 70.5 million dollars (of which 5.7 million dollars was a portion of a 15-million-dollar Export-Import Bank loan). This action was followed by an allocation in early 1951 of 29 million dollars from Mutual Defense Assistance funds when it became evident that Yugoslavia's defense effort was impaired by inability

to secure raw materials on the world market, normally obtained in exchange for Yugoslav export of foodstuffs. The President informed the Congress that these conditions constituted a threat to the security interests of the United States, and funds to meet the raw-materials needs of the armed forces were provided.

Yugoslavia found itself heavily in debt to the countries of the West, with little prospect of ameliorating its deficit position or continuing to meet its obligations without placing added strain upon the economy. In order to meet the crisis from this source, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France conferred in London in the spring of 1951 to formulate a tripartite program of assistance. It was agreed that the three Governments would undertake to cover Yugoslavia's trading deficit by extending grant aid in the ratio of 65 percent by the United States, 23 percent by the United Kingdom, and 12 percent by France. Concurrently the three Governments encouraged Yugoslavia to approach its creditors for postponement of debt payments with a view to minimizing the amount of aid necessary to cover Yugoslavia's trading deficit and to maximizing the effectiveness of the aid extended. Arrangements to postpone debt payments were made with Germany, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

Under the program from July 1951 through June 1952, a total of 120 million dollars in economic assistance was provided. The United States supplied 78 million dollars, the United Kingdom 27.6 million dollars, and France 14.4 million dollars. U.S. aid is now being extended under the terms of a bilateral agreement with Yugoslavia dated January 8, 1952, concluded in accordance with the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

• *Mr. Colbert is an international relations officer in the Office of Eastern European Affairs.*

"Yugoslavia: Titoism and U.S. Foreign Policy"

Department of State Publication 4624, available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. (5¢).

One of the most significant events in the history of world communism is the split between Communist Yugoslavia and Communist Russia. This explanation of U.S. foreign policy toward Yugoslavia shows how and why a democracy and a Communist nation work together to resist Soviet imperialism.

International Labor Cooperation: A Powerful Adjunct to the U.N.

by Bernard Wiesman¹

To discuss international labor cooperation seems an easy task. An impressive array of examples can be cited to demonstrate that workers in three-score nations are linked together in voluntary associations for high purposes of mutual aid and united progress. Such cooperation is a mighty force, a powerful adjunct to the collaboration embodied in the United Nations.

The particular significance of international labor cooperation is not merely the fact that it stems from so many millions of workers located in so many nations and of so many races, creeds, and colors. It is equally significant because a united world structure of free trade-unions can become an integral part of a world order founded on voluntarism and safeguarded by checks and balances. When a national trade-union center joins a bona fide trade-union international, it gives strength and it gets strength. While contributing to the development of world institutions it compels a separation of powers, a distinct economic element paralleling the political structure.

Just as the Constitution of the United States safeguarded the freedom of American citizens by building a political structure of government in three distinct compartments, so also has individual liberty here been further buttressed by the respective autonomies of labor organizations, business organizations, and agricultural organizations.

Is it too much to expect that trade-union internationals can and will make important contributions to international peace, economic stability, and individual freedom? The answer is that international labor cooperation is already contributing to all three.

Activities of the ILO

We know that in World War I, recognition developed among many leaders that real peace can only be established upon a basis of social justice. Samuel Gompers was one of those who saw so clearly and worked so vigorously that part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles established the International Labor Organization. The ILO was and is unique in that it recognizes representatives of industrial organizations of workers and employers respectively, as sharing on a par with those of governments the responsibility for drafting international treaties to set forth basic standards for conditions of employment. The ILO continues as a specialized agency of the United Nations and demonstrates that international codes can be worked out by conference and negotiation of interested parties.

In the maritime field, for example, the ILO has obvious opportunity for setting standards which it is in the self-interest of competitive employers and competitive labor to accept as common minima.

But I think that the ILO has also demonstrated that some of its earliest advocates were unrealistic in expecting international labor legislation to emerge directly from the ILO. Today many of its leaders recognize that organized labor and organized business want to avoid, not to encourage, the practice of legislating their contracts through government. The role of the ILO as the stimulator and moulder of better national labor practices has grown out of the forum of discussion, the laboratory of research and technical assistance, far more than out of the ratification or implementation of international labor conventions. It has brought employers and workers to the same table to face their own problems and to seek to reach acceptable formulas. The ILO has demonstrated that collaboration among nongovernmental organ-

¹Address made before the Silver Jubilee Conference, Catholic Association for International Peace, at Washington on Nov. 8 (press release 864 dated Nov. 7). Mr. Wiesman is labor adviser in the Office of Policy and Plans of the International Information Administration.

izations can be orderly, consistent, and fruitful.

The outstanding cooperation of trade-unions after World War II has thus far been as much political as economic and has grown out of the conflict between the free world and the slave-masters.

WFTU Becomes Ineffectual

I believe that history will record the failure of the Soviet effort to capture the machinery of free labor as one of the pivotal events of the world struggle. Even before V-E Day had arrived, a World Federation of Trade Unions [WFTU] had been convened through Soviet exploitation of the genuine desire of world labor to work together for peace. It comprised virtually all the trade-union centers of the world, except the several national Christian trade-union centers and the American Federation of Labor, which refused to accept the Soviet labor front as a bona fide trade-union. The WFTU had an impressive beginning. It was hailed as a pattern of a new day. Its importance in the Soviet scheme was evidenced, on the eve of the first session of the U.N. Assembly in London in 1946, by the Russian demand that the WFTU be given a 19th seat in the Economic and Social Council—plus a consultative role in the Assembly itself. This extraordinary demand was so extreme that it fell of its own weight, but only after sounding an alarm among many responsible leaders. The subsequent demand for a unique consultative status for the WFTU within Ecosoc precipitated one of the two major conflicts within the Assembly at its first session.

Had the WFTU demand for unique status been granted, it is possible that the subsequent development of the United Nations might have been fatally dominated by this Trojan Horse within. Surely in the Communist scheme, the role of the labor front is not limited by national frontiers. The coup in Czechoslovakia showed how a labor front can be manipulated by the Soviet.

Being one of several consultants rather than unique, and unable to maintain a pretense of universality, WFTU has become a noisy but relatively ineffectual consultant within the United Nations. In January of 1946, however, it could point to national affiliates in almost every U.N. member nation. Had WFTU possessed an exclusive franchise to pose as the voice of world labor within the Economic and Social Council, how extreme a provocation would have been required to force its non-Communist members to sacrifice what would have been their only opportunity to share in U.N. counselling by withdrawing from the WFTU? The failure to achieve unique status within the United Nations not only limited the original importance of WFTU but it left the door open for responsible free trade-unions to exit when the completely Soviet domination of the WFTU was demonstrated repeatedly and unmistakably.

The principle having been established at the first Assembly, Ecosoc has had several "category A" consultant organizations from the beginning. The American Federation of Labor won its credentials through the contest at the first Assembly. The International Federation of Christian Trade Unions [ICTU] also secured status at an early date. Subsequently the A. F. of L., in effect, passed its consultative role to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions [ICFTU] soon after ICFTU was founded late in 1949. Hence, the WFTU has never been able to carry out its self-intended function within the United Nations as a self-supported voice of world labor transcending national governments.

Even outside the United Nations, the WFTU failed to accomplish its mission. Its attempt to set up a sort of supervisory function within the allied occupation organizations in Germany and Japan was thwarted at the outset. Then its efforts to subjugate the international trade secretariats were blocked by the skill and determination of some alert and rugged free trade-unionists. Its masquerade as a legitimate trade-union federation ended when Jim Carey of the CIO insisted that the WFTU inform its membership about the Marshall Plan. He pointed out clearly that this plan for economic reconstruction of Europe would accomplish the purposes of the WFTU resolution which had been unanimously adopted at its initial meeting in London. But logic, which could not overcome the Soviet veto within WFTU, nevertheless could and did supply the remedy for free trade-unions. Every free, non-Communist trade-union center which belonged to the WFTU has subsequently withdrawn. It operates today as an unrestrained voice of Moscow, a dangerous machine for entrapping the unsophisticated, a propaganda mill within the United Nations, an apparatus through which Soviet agents can operate, a front which facilitates sinister operations, especially in Asia.

Progress of the ICFTU

Late in 1949, the A. F. of L., the CIO, and the United Mine Workers together with the great majority of the great free trade-union centers of the non-Communist world met in London and established the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Today the free labor movements of some 70 countries with a membership of about 54 million are operating together through this organization. Except for the Christian Trade Unions which form the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, the ICFTU includes practically all bona fide trade-union centers. It was established not as a negatively anti-Communist machine but as a positively constructive force to build better lives for workers everywhere with peace and freedom from all totalitarianisms.

The ICFTU has progressed a substantial distance

in its 3 years of existence. Having originated *de novo*, with no cadres trained in underground schools for 30 years, such as serve the WFTU, the ICFTU has had to recruit, train, and develop an organization. It has not been easy and its results thus far have not been sensational. Building a world organization through a free constituency of diverse backgrounds and aims, languages and conditions has many difficulties. The internal tensions are obvious. Yet ICFTU can call attention to achievements which in ordinary times would have been triumphs indeed. German, Austrian, Italian, and Japanese members are together in the ICFTU leadership alongside of American, British, French, Scandinavian, Indian, Pakistani, Latin American. Regional organizations have been established in Latin America and Asia, in Africa and Europe. A functioning school for training union leadership opened last week in Calcutta, and training projects in Latin America followed close after summer schools began in Europe. Within the United Nations, the ICFTU has carried forward the major activities begun so skillfully by the A. F. of L. through one of which a U.N. ILO *Ad Hoc* Committee is now studying the evidence of forced labor exploitation by the Soviet and its satellites. Through another, machinery for investigating charges of violations of trade-union rights has been established. In the economic field, the ICFTU has not only contributed to U.N. study of such basic questions as full employment but has contributed its first president, Paul Finet, as one of the members of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community.

Such achievements are real but so much has been expected of ICFTU that its members are impatiently pressing for more and more, faster and more effective.

The International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, which collaborated with ICFTU unions in the European Recovery Program Trade Union Advisory Committee, has continued to work for the accomplishment of the European community. Its members endorsed the election of Paul Finet to the Schuman Plan authority and has put forward, with ICFTU members' support, its veteran leader P. J. S. Serrarens to become a member of the High Court of the European community.

The strength, progressiveness, and growth of Christian trade-unions in Europe are impressive. In France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the Christian Trade Unions have become major factors in collective bargaining and in economic and political life. For example, the veteran Gaston Tessier of the French movement is one of his country's delegates to the U.N. Assembly. Several new affiliates from Latin America and Dutch Guiana and one from Vietnam are evidences of the scope and vitality of ICFTU.

At a time when need for cooperation of all non-Communist elements is so pressing, it is encourag-

ing to note that the ICFTU has declared itself ready to collaborate with the WFTU on condition that the autonomy as well as the spirit and methods of the Christian Trade Union Movement should be respected. One of the first duties of its able new Secretary-General, Vanistendael, will be to explore such possibilities.

Time does not permit adequate discussion of the less spectacular but important collaboration along industrial or craft lines of the so-called international trade secretariats. The International Transport-Workers Federation, the International Metal Workers, the Mine Workers International are the most prominent of a score of organizations through which national trade-unions combine to analyze and discuss common problems of their respective fields. This work has been stimulated by the Industrial Committees of the ILO and by the active participation of American unions, especially during the past 2 or 3 years. The ones named are associated with ICFTU and similar organizations are linked with WFTU.

After the WFTU had lost its free trade-union members and had failed to capture any trade secretariats except the Journalists' Organization, the Soviet agency established nearly a score of industrial departments. They constitute a substantial outlay of Communist cash and presumably are regarded as important propaganda vehicles as well as a fabric for linking individual Communist-controlled unions such as the Harry Bridges' ILWU with their accomplices elsewhere.

Other elements for international cooperation exist through the International Trade Union Center in Exile and the central European Federation of Christian Trade Unions, which focus world attention upon the suppression of trade-union rights in their homelands.

Importance Attached to International Functions

The international activity of major free trade-union centers deserves special mention here. The British, French, and German centers have a tradition of international activity, but I believe none of them can point to a more extensive and energetic activity than that of the A. F. of L. Free Trade Union Committee. Such widespread recognition has been given to the work of Irving Brown in combatting the Communist program in Europe that it is necessary here only to say that the credit for his mission belongs to himself and the Committee. Communist attribution of his work as an accomplishment of the State Department is a compliment which we simply do not deserve. In fact, one of the many proofs of the genuineness of the free trade-union movement has been its complete freedom and frankness in criticizing governmental action. They tell us how we should operate; we have neither the right nor the competence to steer them. It would be a serious omission, moreover, if due credit were not given to the Committee, especially to its executive secretary, Jay Lovestone,

for its constructive contribution to the free world. The Committee has had the guidance of Matthew Woll, Dave Dubinsky, and George Meany and has drawn on the zeal of a Dick Deverall in Asia as well as on the organizing skill of an Irving Brown or a Henry Rutz or the ideological experience of a Harry Goldberg or Harry Kirsh.

The CIO, also, has expanded its field service with the energetic operations of Victor Reuther and his staff in Europe. His work has helped to emphasize training of officers at the plant level and to contribute to the development of trade-union schools and to progress in organizing and administrative methods.

The international responsibilities of Phil Delaney at A. F. of L. and Mike Ross at CIO headquarters are further examples of the importance attached by top trade-unionists to the international function today.

In almost every important foreign mission of the United States, labor attachés or reporting officers are assigned to study labor developments and keep ambassadors and Washington informed and advised. In the International Information Administration, the high importance of labor is also recognized in the development of American propaganda. In several posts, men out of the American labor movement are moulding U.S. output to carry the common message of freedom to working people. These are not merely anti-Communist words; the practical building-up of united action for freedom is the really effective way to hurt communism and their totalitarianisms. For example, the sturdy trade-unionism of our Labor Information Officer in the Philippines, Tom Flynn of Brooklyn, has given life and substance to the informational techniques and American examples which show rank and file workers in that great new nation how to make progress toward real freedom. The Voice of America and local radio, press and publications, the International Motion Picture Service, Information Centers, and the exchange of persons programs are major programs of the Department of State, all of which are being used to help bring the facts of free labor to, and to stimulate effective cooperation among workers everywhere.

Specific examples of useful labor cooperation in all areas could be recited at length but even more evidences could be enumerated of the need for real understanding of common dangers and of practical self-help and united effort to win political, economic, and social freedom and security.

In a nondenominational approach to strengthen the cause of real peace throughout the world, growing awareness exists of the need for religious content. In the task of the International Information Administration, we know that no mere enumeration of materialistic attainments will win the spirit of mankind to our side. Further, since our Campaign of Truth aims at the goal of Peace with Freedom, it necessarily is dedicated to freeing the

human personality from the tyranny of totalitarianism.

Devout men and women of any religion share that goal and can help in its realization just as can and do the practical leaders of free labor of the free world.

Engineers Appointed to International Boundary Commission

Commissioner L. M. Lawson has announced the appointment (press release 849 of October 31) of Joseph F. Friedkin as principal engineer (supervising), and Lyle H. Henderson as principal engineer (planning), of the U.S. section of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico.

The International Boundary and Water Commission consists of the U.S. section at El Paso, Tex., and the Mexican Section at Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. Functioning as an international body under the Department of State and the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Commission is charged with the conduct of a positive program for cooperative action between the two countries in the solution of numerous common boundary problems. Each section is headed by an engineer commissioner and consists of two principal engineers, a legal adviser, and a secretary.

Export-Import Bank To Supply Credit for Mexican Sulfur Plant

The Export-Import Bank of Washington on October 24 announced signing of an agreement under which the Bank will lend 3,664,000 dollars to the Pan-American Sulphur Company of Dallas, Tex., and its Mexican operating subsidiary, Gulf Sulphur de Mexico, S.A. This credit will assist in financing the construction of a 6.7 million-dollar sulfur-extraction plant near Jaltipan, State of Vera Cruz, Mexico. The operation of the Frasch process plant is expected to produce 300,000 or more tons of elemental sulfur per year as an addition to the world supply of this essential material.

The Jaltipan salt dome on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec is a geological formation similar to the sulfur domes of the Gulf Coast which have been a major source of sulfur. Exploratory drilling by Gulf Sulphur de Mexico has disclosed substantial reserves of sulfur which it is planned will be extracted by the Frasch process. The principal features of the plant, financed under this credit, consist of boilers capable of producing 3,300,000 gallons of superheated water per day and associated water-treatment plants, pumps, generators, and related equipment for processing sulfur. A complete town site for employees also will be provided.

The Task Ahead for UNESCO

by *Howland H. Sargeant*

*Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

On a hot July afternoon over a year ago, I declared the sixth session of the General Conference of UNESCO adjourned. At that time I pledged the delegates to serve truly and faithfully as ambassadors of UNESCO's ideas. As we meet again in the seventh General Conference of UNESCO, I am happy to see so many of my old friends among the returning ambassadors of ideas. I welcome new delegates bringing fresh ideas to our deliberations.

I greet with pleasure the representatives of the United Nations and of our sister specialized agencies and those of the nongovernmental organizations whose collaboration is of such importance to the success of UNESCO.

This will be an important General Conference. We find that some of the problems we struggled with last year are still more acute and difficult today. This does not frighten us. We look back on 7 years of UNESCO's steady, healthy growth. Seven years ago this month on November 20, the first General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization convened here in Paris. At that meeting, 48 states were represented, but only 30 of them were voting members. Today 65 states are participating members. They share the responsibility for creating and maintaining the understanding and the cooperation essential to the realization of peace between peoples and the achievement of human progress.

Through 58 National Commissions, through the interest and support of a large number of nongovernmental organizations, and through its own works, UNESCO is becoming known to increasing numbers of people throughout the world. We all take pride in this development. We must also recognize that, as more people come to know UNESCO, we are under heavier obligation not to disappoint their expectations.

The first session of the General Conference of

UNESCO might have adopted a timid course. It might have decided to concentrate merely on promoting intellectual cooperation among scholars or it might have planned a purely technical role for UNESCO. But, a bolder course was charted. The eminent French statesman, M. Leon Blum, who was president of the first session of the General Conference, foresaw two kinds of achievements for UNESCO—on the one hand precise, methodical, and progressive enterprise in a number of essential technical spheres, on the other hand a general combined action affecting the spiritual condition of peoples and individuals.

During succeeding years UNESCO successfully mobilized resources to help restore educational, scientific, and cultural institutions sorely damaged by a devastating war without losing sight of its long-term objectives. During these formative years UNESCO moved forward in technical spheres by encouraging scholarly enterprises and developing ways to bring about closer collaboration between scientists, educators, humanists, creative artists, and writers.

As we open our seventh conference, we are enjoying once more the generous hospitality extended to us by the Republic of France. We meet again in the great city of Paris, the heart of a cultural tradition from which man has derived some of his noblest inspiration. May we draw from these surroundings renewed courage and confidence.

I want to take this occasion to express my personal sorrow at the death since we met together last year of Count Stefano Jacini who contributed so greatly to the development of our organization. During his term as president of the General Conference, his abilities as statesman and scholar gave us a balanced guidance.

We need to remember his words to us last year when he described UNESCO as "the great institution for the defense and dissemination of culture, science, and education." He told us further: "Its subject is human personality—its method is the

¹ Excerpt from an address made before the seventh General Conference of UNESCO at Paris on Nov. 12 (press release 867).

free circulation of ideas and of the instruments of culture—its purpose is peace.”

We shall sorely miss his counsel.

As we gather here, the General Assembly of the United Nations is in session. These two great conferences have certain elements in common. In each case, the Assembly is the democratic community in which the wills of the member nations are expressed. During the period of our deliberations here in Paris, it is we, the delegates to the General Conference, who must speak in the name of UNESCO.

Achievements of the U.N.

At the General Assembly of the United Nations, tremendously difficult problems are being discussed. Although sharp ideological differences are creating divisions among men and although there have been many threats to the peace during the life of the United Nations, each threat to the peace has been dealt with within the framework of the United Nations. In each case save one, the United Nations has helped bring about a cessation of hostilities. The exception is Korea, where member nations are proving the worth of the concept of collective security and of their determination to preserve peace with honor for nations both small and large.

Many who are here today will recall the honor paid us last year by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, in his personal visit to the sixth General Conference. I still recall his eloquent words:

For the first time in history a world organization acted to meet armed aggression with collective forces. Because of that action, and because of the courageous and self-sacrificing fight waged by the United Nations forces in Korea, the development of collective security against war anywhere in the world has been greatly advanced. The men who are fighting and dying under their national flags and the flag of the United Nations serve the noblest of all causes; they are fighting to prevent a third world war.

From these developments we can well take encouragement. I feel that the successes of the United Nations, the parent organization, and of UNESCO, show that a third world war can be avoided. I believe this because I am sure that the peace which men of good will have envisioned can become a reality.

That the peace we want and plead for does not exist today should not discourage us. Rather it should strengthen our resolution to build this peace. UNESCO complements the work of the United Nations in its ability to increase the educational, cultural, and scientific resources of the world and in our ability to promote greater understanding by the peoples in our world of the true requirements for lasting peace. For, unless peoples can be made to understand the present problems of the world sufficiently well to make individual and national choices, they will not see

how they can help fashion the peace. They must understand the substance of the problems which must be solved before peace can be constructed. UNESCO's role is to join in the creation of this understanding, to make peoples aware of the changes that are taking place in the world today so that they can act harmoniously both as individuals and as groups.

UNESCO's Vital Role

I believe this is the task which Secretary-General Lie was describing to us last year when he said:

UNESCO has a key position in the efforts which the United Nations organizations must now make to fulfill in an unsettled world the great purposes for which they were established. Through the wide scope and diversity of its various activities, it has an immense range of contacts throughout the world. Through the nature of its work, it has the possibility of influencing the minds of men and the ideas which motivate men's actions. It has a vital role to play in support of the total United Nations effort for peace.

This is a great and noble task. And in considering this task, it is relevant to ask: How can nations collaborate through education, science, and culture to achieve universal respect for justice and for the rule of law unless their peoples can obtain a clear view of the actions of men and nations which tend to achieve justice and to promote regard for the rule of law, and unless they are equally able to discern what actions taken by men or by nations ignore justice and reject the rule of law?

The intellectual and moral climate conducive to the realization of peace can hardly be achieved unless men come to understand the nature of the world as it is. Is it not, then, a duty of UNESCO to contribute to this understanding by helping men to obtain a clear view of each other's ways of life and of those forces which tend to unify as well as those which tend to divide men among themselves?

We should not be discouraged by the enormity of this task. Instead we should be all the more determined not to let this General Conference become submerged in consideration of petty details and thereby lose sight of the major challenge posed for us by the nature of the world in which we live today.

We should face these problems squarely and courageously in the hope that by taking counsel together we may find solutions and satisfying realistic answers, based firmly upon the principles of UNESCO's charter.

In the present world UNESCO may find that to live up to the principles of its charter may seem frustrating, but each time that our General Conference, our Executive Board, our Director General, or a single member state speak out in defense of our principles when those principles are placed in jeopardy or violated, our cause is strengthened

and our course is made clearer. Every delegate here represents a sovereign nation. He knows that UNESCO was founded on the concept of the independence and integrity of his and every other nation. As our Director General, whose distinguished leadership has served as such an inspiration to us, has so well said:

It has never been the purpose of UNESCO to turn citizens from their national loyalties, we are trying to do something quite different: to train citizens—since we are concerned with education—who will be faithful in their duty to their country and who, for that very reason, will also be loyal to the international obligations which their country has assumed.

Every delegate here knows that UNESCO hopes to preserve the "fruitful diversity of cultures" of its member states. We realize the rich treasures of creative achievement springing from these diverse cultures. We of the New World have long been aware of our indebtedness to other cultures, to the Near East and Far East, and to Europe. We know also that we are busy opening spiritual and cultural frontiers of our own; that, in a cultural sense, we are continuing Columbus' spirit of discovery.

Delegates from other nations value their cultures as fully as we Americans cherish ours. Together in UNESCO we seek the free exchange of knowledge and the free flow of ideas that bring about a more perfect understanding of each other's cultures. We want none of their values to be lost. We want each to contribute to the utmost in our common human endeavor.

The strength of the nations, which can honestly and genuinely subscribe to and uphold UNESCO, lies in their recognition of the wide diversity among cultures and their basic agreement on fundamental principles and obligations.

U.N. Begins New Consideration of South African Racial Question

*Statement by Charles A. Sprague
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

For the sixth time, the General Assembly is called upon to deal with this complaint that persons are being discriminated against because of race and color. The very fact that this problem has repeatedly come before us is in itself an index of the difficulties that have been encountered in finding a satisfactory solution.

Because it is so difficult, it is important for us to state clearly the purposes for which we enter this discussion. If this definition of purpose does not shorten the road it may increase our courage to go forward.

I speak for a country which was founded upon

¹ Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Nov. 4 on the question of treatment of Indians in South Africa.

the belief that all men are created equal and that the function of government is to protect the rights of all men alike to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Safeguards for these basic rights were written into our Constitution and then further and more detailed safeguards were worked out in the 10 amendments which we know as our Bill of Rights.

We were then a country of many national strains and many religious beliefs who treasured individual liberty all the more because of personal experience with intolerance and oppression.

Since that time we have learned again and again the value in diversity as our economy and our culture have been enriched and enlarged by streams of immigrants of many nationalities and the most varied habits and beliefs. In signing the Charter of the United Nations, whose preamble implicitly affirms the faith of our organization in the dignity and worth of the individual human being and in the equality of human rights, we reaffirmed a belief which many of us consider fundamental to our national strength and vitality.

But let me say that to translate ideals into realities in the field of human relations is a long and difficult task as we well know. Though our Declaration of Independence proclaimed that all men are created free and equal, the Emancipation Proclamation by President Lincoln was not made until 87 years later. It took a long and bloody civil war to end the evil of human slavery. And although we adopted three additional amendments to our Constitution to confirm equality under the law, the question of civil rights remains one of the acute problems in my own country. My own State of Oregon, and others, have passed laws for fair employment practices to prohibit discrimination in employment on the grounds of race or color or religion; but there is still resistance in many areas to compulsory legislation on this subject, and related matters of civil rights.

The roots of discrimination run deep. They may lie in fear, or ignorance, or prejudice, or they may lie in wide disparities of culture and education and resources which cannot be erased by a mere fist of law. The relations vary as conditions vary within nations and among groups. Progress comes in human relations when equality of opportunity is provided through the spread of education and through moral enlightenment. That is slow, painfully slow, discouragingly slow, as our own experience has shown.

All nations in any true confessional would have to admit their own shortcomings. Racial pride and prejudice are the more pronounced where groups of the more advanced civilizations are in contact with less developed peoples and where the standard of living is low and the struggle for existence sharpens the ancient prejudices.

Despite the difficulties that lie along this path there should be no controversy over the direction in which the path should lead. The Charter sets

forth as the third of the purposes of the United Nations:

To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

So the test is not just how bad conditions are in the country but whether efforts are being made to improve those conditions in the direction of the goals set by the Charter. That is where the concern of this Committee arises over the subject now under consideration—the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa. Here there appears to be a serious difference in direction in national policy from that endorsed by the Charter.

There is an important distinction to be drawn between the haphazard, vestigial, unsanctioned violations of human rights which continue to occur in all countries and a situation such as this where it is complained that governmental policy runs counter to the whole current of modern philosophy and scientific knowledge and to the line of social and humanitarian conduct recommended in the Charter.

It is true that the question before us today has its own peculiar dimensions of geography, of numerical proportion, of cultural divergence and economic relationships. However, extreme and peculiar difficulties do not relieve a government of its responsibilities; nor can it relieve the United Nations of its obligations in this field.

Creating a Favorable Atmosphere

The question remains: What can we hope to accomplish by this renewed discussion of a problem which has already occupied the attention of five Assemblies?

My hope and the hope of my Government is to create an atmosphere favorable to negotiation between the parties. A complaint has been brought before us and we must lend whatever wisdom and experience we have to the discussion without attempting to impose any solution—however ingenious—to a problem that must finally be solved by the parties themselves.

We can hope for progress only to the extent that the parties are willing to confer. The many and disappointing set-backs in this case have occurred precisely because contact has been broken off, thus making impossible even the exchange of views essential to any settlement. It is for this reason that we believe our activity can most usefully be directed toward bringing the parties together. Conversely, we must try to avoid any action which may in any way hinder the resumption of negotiations.

This is not a new definition of our purposes or of our methods. All of the resolutions passed by previous sessions of the Assembly have been directed toward this end.

The history of this question before this Assembly need not be rehearsed. All are familiar with the fact that previous efforts to settle this question have met with failure. What the Assembly may do must be considered in the light of our experience. Of one thing we should be sure and that is that any proposal must be measured by the purpose set forth in article I, subparagraphs 3 and 4 of the Charter:

To achieve international cooperation . . . in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Note that the purpose must be to *promote* and to *encourage* the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Every proposal must be squared with that intent. Resolutions should not be provocative nor such as would excite adverse nationalist reactions. Rather they must follow the path of accommodation through negotiation in the true spirit of the Charter.

Doubtful Provisions of New Resolutions

My delegation will consider every proposal by this yardstick defined in the Charter. Using this yardstick, the United States believes that the proposal before us sponsored by the 14 delegations sets forth a possible approach to the problem; but it does, by the same measure, contain certain provisions about which my delegation has some doubts.

I have in mind, first, the provision in paragraph 4 which "calls upon the Government of the Union of South Africa to suspend the implementation of enforcement of the provisions of the Group Areas Act, pending the conclusion of the negotiations." With respect to this paragraph, the passage of time has strengthened the doubts which we expressed last year of the advisability of singling out for censure a specific piece of national legislation, however unacceptable the philosophy of that legislation may be to many of us.

Furthermore, in my judgment, there is a more important objection to the paragraph. This paragraph appears to impose a condition precedent to the negotiations between the parties. Although this condition may represent our own view of a satisfactory negotiating situation, its inclusion may actually impair the achievement of our first and immediate objective: to have the parties sit down together and resume their negotiations. Finally, the subject of this paragraph would seem to fall more logically under the next item on our agenda, namely: The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa.

My delegation also has some doubts about paragraph 2 and paragraph 5. These paragraphs request the Good Offices Commission to report to the eighth session of the General Assembly and

Text of Resolution¹

U.N. doc. A/AC.61/L.7
Dated November 12, 1952

The General Assembly,

RECALLING its resolutions 44 (I), 265 (III), 395 (V) and 511 (VI) relating to the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa,

NOTING that the Government of the Union of South Africa has expressed its inability to accept General Assembly resolution 511 (VI) in respect of the resumption of negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan,

NOTING further that the Government of the Union of South Africa has continued to enforce the Group Areas Act in contravention of the terms of General Assembly resolutions 511 (VI) and 395 (V),

1. *Establishes* a United Nations Good Offices Commission consisting of . . . members to be nominated by the President of the General Assembly, with a view to arranging and assisting in negotiations between the Government of the Union of South Africa and the Governments of India and Pakistan in order that a satisfactory solution of the question in accordance with the Principles and Purposes of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be achieved;

2. *Requests* the Good Offices Commission to report to the General Assembly at its eighth session;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the members of the Commission with the necessary staff and facilities;

4. *Calls upon* the Government of the Union of South Africa to suspend the implementation or enforcement of the provisions of the Group Areas Act, pending the conclusion of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 1 above;

5. *Decides* to include this item in the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly.

¹ Sponsored by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, and Yemen.

The resolution was approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Nov. 11 by a vote of 41-1 (Union of South Africa).

the inclusion of this item on the agenda of that Assembly.

Our doubts about these paragraphs are also connected with our single aim of encouraging and assisting negotiations between the parties. It seems to my delegation that we may not be helpful to the Good Offices Commission in instructing it when to report and in deciding now to put this item on the agenda of the eighth General Assembly. If the Good Offices Commission deems it useful to report to the next session, it will be mandatory under Rule 13 of our Rules of Procedure for the Secretary-General to include the report on the provisional agenda. Moreover, even if the Good Offices Commission should choose not to report to the eighth session, any member is entitled to propose the inclusion of the item on the agenda of that session. It would thus be sufficient to request the Good Offices Commission to report to the

Assembly at such time as it deems appropriate; the last paragraph of the draft resolution could be omitted altogether.

With these reservations my delegation will support the 14-power draft.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Social Welfare Conferences in India

The Department of State on November 14 (press release 873) announced that many Americans distinguished in the field of social-welfare work in the United States are planning to attend two international conferences which are to be held in India during the month of December.

On December 5, 1952, at Bombay, the International Union for Child Welfare is convening an international study conference with the general theme "Child Welfare in Relation to Social Services and the Raising of Standards of Living." Participants will discuss (1) the education of parents with regard to the physical health of the child, including feeding and housing; (2) the education of parents with regard to the mental health of the child; (3) the role of health visitors in relation to the education of parents; (4) the role of other services and organizations. Before the adjournment of the conference on December 12, there will be a special session, in cooperation with the International Society for the Welfare of Cripples, on "Care and Education of the Physically Handicapped Child."

The International Union for Child Welfare is a federation of national and international organizations, mostly voluntary agencies, concerned with promoting the well-being of children the world over.

At Madras, India, December 14-19, 1952, the Sixth International Conference of Social Work will be held. Since 1928, when the First International Conference of Social Work was held at Paris, this series of nongovernmental conferences has served as an international forum for the discussion of important social-work issues and for the exchange of information and experience among social workers and social agencies throughout the world. It has consultative status with the United Nations. The main theme for discussion will be the role of social services in raising standards of living everywhere, with particular reference to the development of social services in underdeveloped areas. It is expected that the Sixth Conference will serve as a focal point for the coordination of activity, integration of planning, and stimulation of social-welfare and health-development projects in the Far East for the years ahead. The Seventh Conference is to be held at Toronto in 1954.

American participation in these conferences will be under the leadership of the U.S. Committee for the International Conference of Social Work. Lester B. Granger, Executive Director of the National Urban League, and Fred K. Hoehler, Director of the Illinois Department of Public Welfare, are co-chairmen of the committee for the international conference at Madras.

U.S. Government officials attending both Conferences in their individual capacities include: Oscar R. Ewing, Administrator of the Federal Security Agency; Jane M. Hoey, Director of the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Federal Security Agency and Alternate U.S. Representative on the Social Commission of the United Nations, which is concerned with the raising of living standards in underdeveloped areas; Wilbur J. Cohen, Technical Adviser to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Federal Security Agency; and Melvin A. Glasser, Special Assistant for State and National Relations of the Children's Bureau, Federal Security Agency, and President of the International Federation of Social Workers.

Other Government officials attending in private capacities are Mildred Arnold, Director of the Division of Social Services of the Children's Bureau; Ruth Bartlett, Regional and Child Welfare Representative, Children's Bureau; and Bessie Trout, Consultant on Staff Development, Children's Bureau.

Among the heads of national organizations in the field of social welfare who will be attending the conference in Madras will be Robert E. Bondy, Director of the National Social Welfare Assembly; Joseph P. Anderson, Executive Secretary of the American Association of Social Workers; Loula Dunn, Director of the American Public Welfare Association; and Margaret Hickey, Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the American National Red Cross.

Dr. Henry H. Kessler of the Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation, and past President and member of the Council of the International Society for the Welfare of Cripples, is planning to attend both Conferences, as are approximately 90 other specialists in the field of social work from the United States. The Fifth Conference, held at Paris in 1950, was attended by approximately 1,800 persons from 47 countries.

At this time it is known that the Conferences will also be attended by interested specialists from Belgium, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Japan, Malaya, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.

While he is in Bombay, Mr. Ewing will attend a regional conference, held under the auspices of the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, on free and compulsory education in South Asia and the Pacific. En route to and from

these Conferences, Mr. Ewing will visit a number of countries for the purpose of holding discussions with Government officials and others interested in social welfare. It is expected that in these discussions he will describe in particular U.S. Government activities in the fields of education, health, and social security, as well as the ways in which the various economic-aid programs, including Point Four, have assisted in the development of the social-welfare activities of the underdeveloped areas.

Seventh Conference of UNESCO

The Department of State announced on November 6 (press release 861) that the U.S. delegation to the seventh General Conference of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) which convenes at Paris on November 12, 1952, will be as follows:

U.S. representatives

Howland H. Sargeant, *Chairman*, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
Walter W. Laves, *Vice chairman*, Vice President for Research, Governmental Affairs Institute, Washington
Luther Evans, Librarian of Congress, Washington

Alternate U.S. representatives

Robert C. Angell, *Chairman*, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Walter M. Kotschnig, *Director*, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Max McCullough, *Director*, UNESCO Relations Staff, Department of State

Congressional adviser

Charles W. Tobey, U.S. Senate

Advisers

David Apter, UNESCO Relations Staff, Department of State
Sarah Caldwell, *President*, National Education Association, Washington
Monsignor Frederick G. Hochwalt, *Director of Education*, National Catholic Education Association, Washington
Caroline C. Laise, *Division of International Administration*, Department of State
Paul H. Sheats, *Professor of Education*, University of California, Los Angeles
Elvin C. Stakman, *Chief*, Division of Plant Pathology and Botany, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis
Charles A. Thomson, *Counselor of Embassy for UNESCO Affairs*, American Embassy, Paris

Secretary of delegation

David Persinger, *Division of International Conferences*, Department of State

Technical secretary

Robert S. Smith, *Assistant Attaché*, American Embassy, Paris

Reports officer

Mary W. Umbarger, *Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs*, Department of State

Administrative officer

Mason A. LaSelle, *Assistant Conference Attaché*, American Consulate General, Geneva

UNESCO is a specialized agency of the United Nations which carries on widespread and varied educational, scientific, and cultural activities designed to promote international understanding and to contribute to improved conditions of stability and well-being in many countries. Within its broad mandate it is focusing its work increasingly on three major lines of effort: (1) assisting underdeveloped countries to accelerate their development through programs of technical assistance and fundamental education; (2) facilitating interchange of knowledge and information among scholars, educators, and other specialists through international seminars, publishing of materials, and creation of international voluntary associations; and (3) contributing to citizen understanding of international relationships.

Pan American Highway Congress

The Department of State announced on October 25 (press release 842) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the Special Session of the Pan American Highway Congress, which will convene on October 26 at Mexico, D.F., by the following delegation:

Chairman

Jack G. Scott, Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation, Department of Commerce

Special Congressional delegate

Spessard L. Holland, U.S. Senate

Delegates

Robert B. Brooks, Consulting Engineer, St. Louis, Mo.

Edwin W. James, Chief, Inter-American Regional Office, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce

Henry H. Kelly, Office of Transportation and Communications, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

Charles P. Nolan, Officer in Charge, Transportation and Communications, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Paul B. Reinhold, President, American Roadbuilders' Association, Washington, D.C.

Russell Singer, Executive Vice President, American Automobile Association, Washington, D.C.

Francis Turner, Assistant to the Commissioner, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce

Secretary

Melville Osborne, Assistant Attaché, American Embassy, Mexico City

During the Special Session, representatives of the 21 American Republics will discuss important measures looking toward the earliest possible completion of the Pan American Highway System and the development of continental highways. Important agenda items relate to the best means of financing the uncompleted portions of the Pan American Highway System from Alaska to Argentina, the creation of an efficient highway department, the planning of highway development in each country, and the possible establishment of technical committees to function during the intervals between the periodic highway congresses.

November 24, 1952

Inter-American Congress of Radiology

The Department of State announced on November 3 (press release 855) that the U.S. delegation to the fourth Inter-American Congress of Radiology, which is to be held at México, D. F., November 2-8, 1952, will be as follows:

Chairman

James T. Case, M.D., Professor Emeritus, Department of Radiology, Northwestern University, Chicago

Delegates

Paul C. Aebersold, Ph.D., Director, Isotopes Division, Atomic Energy Commission, Oak Ridge, Tenn.

Joseph C. Bell, M.D., Associate Professor in Radiology, University of Louisville Medical School, Louisville

George C. Bess, Lt. Col., U.S.A.F. (MC), 5th Medical Group, Travis Air Force Base, Calif.

Howard P. Doub, M.D., Chief, Department of Radiology, Henry Ford Hospital, Detroit

Gioscchino Failla, M.D., Member, Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine, Atomic Energy Commission, Washington

Lowell S. Goin, M.D., Roentgenologist to Queen of Angels Hospital, Los Angeles

Ross Golden, M.D., Professor of Radiology, Columbia University, New York

Philip J. Hodes, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Radiology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

Maurice Lenz, M.D., Professor of Clinical Radiology, College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, New York

Egon Lorenz, Ph.D., Chief, Laboratory of Biophysics, National Cancer Institute, Bethesda, Md.

Eugene P. Pendergrass, M. D., Professor of Radiology, Hospital of University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

Edith H. Quimby, Sc. D., Associate Professor of Radiology, College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, New York

Juan A. del Regato, M. D., Director Penrose Cancer Hospital, Colorado Springs

Waldron M. Sennott, M. D., Chief Roentgenologist, U. S. Public Health Service Hospital, Stapleton, N. Y.

The discussions and the technical papers to be presented at the fourth congress relate to the therapeutic benefits and the toxicities resulting from the use of radioisotopes.

In addition to the governmental delegation, participants from the United States will include other specialists attending in their private capacities as members of the Radiology Society of North America, the American Roentgen Ray Society, the American Radium Society, the American College of Radiology, and the section on radiology of the American Medical Association.

Special Meeting on Frequency Planning (ICAO)

The Department of State announced on October 28 (press release 843) that, under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a special meeting on Frequency Planning for the European-Mediterranean Region would convene on that day at Paris. As a member state in ICAO, with U.S. planes operating in the region, the U.S. Government is participating in the meeting through an official delegation, which is as follows:

Chairman

Seymour Stearns, Major, Frequency Branch, Directorate of Communications, U.S. Air Force

Members

Ellery E. Estes, Chief, Frequency Utilization Section, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

William J. McKnight, Manager, Liaison Activities, Aeronautical Radio, Inc.

Donald C. Mitchell, Assistant Chief, Aviation Division, Federal Communications Commission

Advisers

William O. Ezell, Major, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Europe

Gordon W. Smith, Captain, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Europe

Standing Committee on Performance (ICAO)

The Department of State announced on November 12 (press release 868) that the third meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization's Standing Committee on Performance had convened at Montreal on November 11. The U.S. delegation to this meeting is as follows:

Delegate

Raymond B. Maloy, Chief, Engineering Flight Test Branch, Office of Aviation Safety, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Alternate delegates

John A. Carran, Chief, Aerodynamics Section, Office of Aviation Safety, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Hugh B. Freeman, Aeronautical Engineer, Airworthiness Division, Civil Aeronautics Board

Advisers

Joseph Matulaitis, Chief, International and Regulations Staff, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

F. Stanley Nowlan, Jr., Engineering Consultant to the Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Since 1950 various ICAO bodies have worked on the development of aircraft-performance standards for inclusion in the Operations and Airworthiness Annexes (Annexes 6 and 8) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. In 1951, on the recommendation of the ICAO Airworthiness and Operations Divisions and with the approval of the ICAO Council, the Air Navigation Commission established a small standing committee to carry on necessary technical studies and discussions. This committee, which is composed of technical specialists provided by interested ICAO contracting states and the International Air Transport Association, has held meetings at Montreal, November 6-16, 1951, and at Copenhagen, May 19-June 9, 1952, and is reconvening for the purpose of compelling draft standards so that trial applications may be made of those standards before its fourth meeting in Europe in 1953.

The development of aircraft performance standards requires detailed study of many highly complex technical operating factors. The standing committee has been concerned, for example, with

the effects of various systems of feathering propellers, the design and power factors which must be observed to provide for safety in the event of the failure of one or more engines of a plane in flight, the analysis of data on balked landing statistics, study of the speeds essential to take-off safety, and an analysis of the flight paths (speeds, heights, configurations) essential to safety in connection with final approaches and balked landings. All such studies must of course take into account the different characteristics of different types of transport aircraft, as well as differences between turbine and reciprocating-engined aircraft.

International Wool Study Group

The Department of State announced on November 3 (press release 854) that Eric Englund, attaché, American Embassy, London, will be the U.S. delegate to the fifth meeting of the International Wool Study Group, which will begin on that date at London. He will be assisted by Eugene T. Ransom, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture, who will serve as alternate U.S. delegate.

The main objectives of the forthcoming meeting are to examine the current position of wool in the world, using various reports prepared by the Management Committee of the Study Group and other available information, and to review the statements presented by each member country on its wool situation.

The membership of the Wool Study Group, which is open to any country substantially interested in the production, consumption, or trade in wool, consists of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Switzerland, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. In addition, Brazil, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Portugal, and Spain have been invited to attend the forthcoming meeting.

Dr. Martha M. Eliot Attends Meeting on Child Care

Press release 856 dated Nov. 3

Dr. Martha M. Eliot, U.S. technical delegate on the Directing Council of the American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood, attended the third regional meeting of technical delegates at Mexico, D.F., November 3 to 6, at the request of the Director of the Institute.

This meeting, one of a series of regional discussions organized by the Institute, was convened for the purpose of presenting reports of the work being done and advancement made in the field of child care in the areas of Cuba, the Dominican

Republic, Haiti, the United States, and probably Venezuela. Each meeting in this series is designed to enable the participants to discuss reports on such subjects as health, social welfare, education, and legislation pertaining to children in their respective countries; to explore opportunities for encouraging the training of persons engaged in activities relating to children; and to consider the possibility of establishing closer interrelationships among the professional groups concerned with child welfare in the various countries represented.

Dr. Eliot participated as an observer in the second regional meeting of technical delegates held at Montevideo on June 12, 1952, which was attended by representatives from Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. A fourth meeting will

be held early in 1953 to consider activities in the countries of the north and northwest part of South America.

The Institute, established in 1927, serves as a center of social action, information, documentation, and study of all aspects of child life and welfare. The governing body of the Institute, known as the Directing Council, is composed of two delegates from each member country—a resident delegate at Montevideo, which is the headquarters of the Institute, and a technical delegate having responsibility for matters relating to childhood and resident in the country he represents. Dr. Eliot, who is Chief of the Children's Bureau, Federal Security Agency, was appointed U.S. technical delegate by the President on January 12, 1952, for a 3-year term.

The United States in the United Nations

[November 8-14, 1952]

General Assembly

Secretary-General's Resignation—In the Nov. 10 plenary session, Trygve Lie read the following letter which he had handed that morning to Lester Pearson, President of the Assembly:

Dear Mr. Pearson, I wish to refer to our personal and confidential conversation on the eleventh of September, in which I informed you that I had decided, after lengthy consideration over many months, to submit my resignation as Secretary-General of the United Nations.

It had been my intention—as I informed you then—to take this step at the opening of the seventh session of the General Assembly. I have delayed until today, when the Foreign Ministers of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council are all present for the first time during this session, in the hope that this will facilitate agreement on my successor.

I shall be grateful if you would propose as a new item on the agenda "Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations."

He explained to the delegates that his resignation, postponed in 1950 because of the aggression in Korea, was based on his belief that a new Secretary-General might be more helpful at this stage of the Korean situation. The completion of the headquarters buildings and the organization of the Secretariat were also factors in his decision "that this is the time to leave without damage to the United Nations, and that it would be better for the United Nations if I do so now." He concluded:

I would like the members to know that I am stepping aside now because I hope this may help the United Nations to save the peace and to serve better the cause of freedom and progress for all mankind.

The Assembly voted Nov. 13 to place the appointment of a Secretary-General on its agenda.

General Debate Continues—Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, addressed the Assembly on Nov. 10, emphasizing particularly the attitude of his Government on the Tunisia and Morocco items. Following are excerpts:

The Assembly decided, in spite of the reservations we have expressed, to place on its agenda two charges regarding the situation in Tunisia and Morocco.

The representative of France finds himself under the obligation of cautioning this Assembly not only against the injustice which certain people are trying to have it perpetrate; against the insult that is being inflicted upon his country by accusing it; against the repercussions that any intervention of any sort is bound to have outside the United Nations; but also and primarily against the harm that would thus be done to the organization itself.

It is the duty of the Assembly in its wisdom to know how to keep within the limits of its mission and not to take, before history, the responsibility laden with incalculable consequences, of jeopardizing, by exceeding its powers, a task that France, in faith and pride, has undertaken, is pursuing, and shall continue to carry on in North Africa.

France is bound to Tunisia and Morocco by treaties contracted between sovereign states. In accordance with these treaties, the foreign relations of Morocco and Tunisia can be conducted only within the framework provided by the treaties—that is, through the intermediary of France. These same treaties stipulate that the reforms which are to be carried out in the two countries shall be effected in close and exclusive cooperation with France and upon France's initiative.

As the Assembly well knows, the U.N. organization has not been given competence to deal in any way, even indirectly, with the revision of treaties.

What is the general system of relations between France on the one hand and Tunisia and Morocco on the other,

first with regard to the terms of these treaties themselves, then with regard to their actual implementation? It is essentially a matter of an exchange between the signatory states of reciprocal rights and responsibilities.

France insures their diplomatic representations in the other states and their citizens abroad are protected in the same way and to the same extent as French citizens.

On the security level, Tunisia and Morocco are included in the French national defense perimeter and plans, which, furthermore, relieves them of one of the most crushing burdens that states must carry in our time.

On the economic level, the economies of these countries—quite rudimentary at the start, now prosperous, complex and stable, thanks to the task performed by France—are expanding with her support, thus finding markets and assistance within the broader economy of our country, which insures their equipment while balancing their budget, their foreign trade, and their balance of payments.

From the social standpoint, France brought to the states to whom she thus grants assistance, labor laws and relations which enable the workers of these countries to benefit from the great emancipating surge of our time.

Finally, on the cultural level, France places her culture within the reach of Tunisian and Moroccan nationals, as she does for her own citizens, while at the same time scrupulously respecting their traditions, institutions, civilization, and religion.

France considers that it would be a grave, an unpardonable error on her part, if territories still imperfectly developed, for which she is now responsible in varying degrees, should set themselves up as independent states before they are able to meet the heavy responsibilities this would imply.

Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden (U.K.) spoke during the general debate on Nov. 12. He mentioned as major problems confronting the U.N. the question of free German elections, the Austrian treaty, disarmament, questions relating to dependent peoples, and Korea. The four basic principles to be taken into account in ending the Korean conflict, he said, are—

That every prisoner of war has the right, on the conclusion of an armistice, to be released.

That every prisoner of war has the right to be speedily repatriated.

That there is a duty on the detaining side to provide facilities for such repatriation.

That the detaining side has no right to use force in connection with the disposal of prisoners of war.

In other words, after an armistice, a prisoner of war may not be either forcibly detained or forcibly repatriated.

He hoped that the U.S.S.R. representative would examine these principles carefully. If they were accepted, "then it should be possible to put them in a clearly understood resolution which will command agreement among all the parties." Mr. Eden also said that the revised Soviet resolution (see below) did not help to solve the present impasse, as it stipulated that all prisoners must be repatriated. He added, however, that at a later stage there might be scope for some such commission as proposed by the Soviet Union.

Ad Hoc Political Committee—On the item relating to the treatment of people of Indian origin in South Africa, the Committee on Nov. 11 approved by a vote of 41-1 (Union of South Africa)-16 a resolution establishing a good offices com-

mission "with a view to arranging and assisting in negotiations" between the parties so that a "satisfactory" solution of the problem could be achieved. (For statement by U.S. representative and text of resolution, see p. 835.)

Debate began Nov. 12 on the item, "The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Union of South Africa." Opening arguments centered around the competence of the General Assembly to deal with the question. Gerhardus P. Jooste (South Africa) reviewed his Government's position on competence, stressing that article 2 (7) removed matters of domestic concern from the scope of the Charter, except for enforcement measures under chapter VII.

As to the allegation that South Africa was threatening the peace, he argued that a threat existed only when the territorial integrity or political independence of another state was threatened. It was up to the Committee to decide whether it adhered to the interpretations put on the Charter at San Francisco or whether the guarantees and protection inscribed in article 2 (7) "have now become extinct." Never before, he concluded, had the U.N. been called on to give a competent decision which could have such tremendous consequences.

Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (India) declared that the question of competence could be appreciated only against the background of the subject and proceeded to describe South Africa's discriminatory legislation. She said it had brought about a situation which flagrantly violated Charter principles and was a growing threat to international peace.

Subsequent arguments upholding the Assembly's competence to discuss the question were offered by Sweden and Norway. The U.K. and New Zealand representatives expressed the view that the Charter excluded the item from the Assembly's competence. Brazil favored postponement of a decision on competence until after the conclusion of general debate on the subject.

Committee I (Political and Security)—Andrei Vyshinsky (U.S.S.R.) introduced on Nov. 10 a revised text of the Soviet draft resolution submitted by him on Oct. 29. The revised text provides for the establishment of a commission for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, to be composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of China, India, Burma, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, and South Korea. The original text did not specify the membership of this commission.

The new Soviet draft also adds to the terms of reference of this commission the task of extending "all possible" assistance to the repatriation of "all prisoners of war" by both sides.

Mr. Vyshinsky introduced the revised proposal at the end of a lengthy statement in which he

declared that international obligations of states could not be subordinated to the will of individual prisoners of war. The Geneva Convention, he argued, made repatriation of all prisoners of war mandatory. Mr. Vyshinsky rejected as "unacceptable" both the Mexican and the Peruvian proposals which deal with the prisoner-of-war issue.

Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan (Pakistan), speaking on Nov. 14, proposed an immediate ceasefire in Korea without waiting for agreement on the repatriation question. His delegation agrees with the U.N.'s stand against forced repatriation, he emphasized, but "we would beg to be forgiven for stating that we see no logical connection between the resolving of these questions and the continuation of the fighting. We consider that the fighting, and the prolongation of all the suffering, misery, and agony consequent upon it, can and should be stopped, even failing an immediate agreement on these points and pending their more leisurely consideration."

Another proposal for a solution was introduced by Abba S. Eban (Israel), who asked that the Assembly agree on a formula as to the principles of repatriation and then recommend the creation of a joint body that would "decide upon the claims and submissions of prisoners desiring not to utilize their rights of repatriation." Technical procedures could be left to that body.

Committee II (Economic and Financial)—Isador Lubin (U.S.) replied on Nov. 11 to statements made by representatives of Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R., the Ukraine, and Byelorussia during general debate on the item, economic development of underdeveloped countries, which concluded Nov. 8. He pointed out that the ratio of earning of capital for all direct U.S. investment abroad, excluding petroleum, was 12.4 percent, while the ratio of earnings of capital invested in the U.S. was 10.7 percent. This, he said, indicated that the relatively greater risk involved in foreign investment was compensated for by only about 1.7 percentage points. Mr. Lubin added that, of the profits actually earned in 1946-52, over 4.8 billion dollars, or about half the total earned, were ploughed back.

Mr. Lubin further drew attention to the fact that, during the period 1920-40, the net loss of capital value of portfolio investments suffered by American investors abroad was almost 3.5 billion dollars. He added that more and more American private investment was tending to go into manufacturing and distribution and less into extractive industries.

Mr. Lubin declared he was proud of the way in which the Point Four Program had contributed to the security and progress which were the goals of the U.N. He related the recent economic difficulties of Poland and Czechoslovakia, such as the appearance of shortages in supplies and of bottle-

necks in transportation, to the very heavy claims of the Soviet armament effort.

Andrei A. Gromyko (U.S.S.R.), in reply to statements made by various representatives, pointed out that his own previous statement had been based on utterances of a number of U.S. personalities. He reiterated that U.S. aid to other countries was aimed at the militarization of the latter in the interest of "the American war machine" and for the benefit of American businessmen.

Mr. Gromyko regretted that certain delegations felt unable to speak their minds on the real significance for them of U.S. aid, although, he said, at this session, a greater number of delegations had expressed dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs.

He denied that the Soviet Union had failed to come forward with any constructive proposal. As proof of the contrary he mentioned the Soviet request for elimination of U.S. imposed discrimination in international trade. He added that the U.S.S.R. could supply a number of goods that would be useful for economic development.

On Nov. 12 the Committee took up the sub-item, expanded program of technical assistance. David Owen, chairman of the U.N. Technical Assistance Board, reported that the Board had recruited 1,598 technical experts as of Oct. 1; 956 were now in the field. He said the Technical Assistance Program faced bigger demands than ever before and called on member countries to increase their contributions for the coming year in order to arrive at the total of 25 million dollars which would be needed.

Speaking on Nov. 13, Mr. Lubin confirmed his Government's support of the Program. He emphasized the importance of technical-assistance work in the field of public administration, which he said was fundamental to the success of the entire program.

The success of economic-development programs within any country depends to an important extent upon the effectiveness of the administration and the services provided by the government of the recipient country. This is as true of financial as it is of technical aspects of the program. And it is equally true whether the program is of international or local origin. The technical-assistance experts have to rely upon the departments of the recipient governments that have the responsibility to carry out the programs which the experts recommend. No matter how good a technical-assistance project to increase cotton production through the introduction of modern methods is, it will not yield any great results unless the local Ministry of Agriculture can bring the new techniques supplied by the foreign experts within the reach of the average farmer.

In the improvement of public administration, much can be gained from an interchange of experience between different governments and the preparation of bulletins and reports showing how various countries have solved common administrative problems. We are therefore pleased that the U.N. has placed so much importance upon such exchanges of experience. Possibly such exchanges can best be carried out on a regional basis, and we have noted with interest that the distinguished delegate of Egypt has suggested that the administrative problems involved

in land-reform programs be dealt with in a regional seminar in the Middle Eastern area.

It is clear that more trained public administrators are needed. There appears to be a particular lack of these essential technicians in many countries in the process of economic development. I am glad that my delegation is pleased to note that a number of fellowships have been awarded by the U.N. in this field and that a number of seminars and institutes are in preparation. The U.S. will continue fully to cooperate with the multilateral programs which provide technical assistance along such lines. Such exchanges of information, of experience, and of training have paid real dividends in the U.S., where we have had long experience in doing this between our various States and cities and our national Government. The U.S. itself has also profited from such exchanges of ideas and from our participating in conferences with government officials of other countries.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural)—The Committee completed the agenda item relating to problems of freedom of information by passing two resolutions on Nov. 10 and a third on Nov. 11. The first resolution proposes an international conference for the purpose of preparing a draft International Code of Ethics in the field of information. The vote was 43 (U.S.)-5-7.

The second proposal, designed to prevent dissemination of false news, was sponsored by El Salvador and Guatemala and was approved by a vote of 37-1 (Denmark)-12. The final resolution, proposed by Egypt and amended by the U.S., France, Greece, and the U.S.S.R., urges that Governments, the Secretary-General, and media of information disseminate information about action taken by the U.N.

Committee IV (Trusteeship)—The Committee on Nov. 8 voted to continue the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories for a 3-year period, at the end of which, unless the General Assembly decided otherwise, the Committee would be continued automatically "for as long as there exist territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government." The vote was 40-12 (U.S.)-2.

Philip Jessup (U.S.) had stated on Nov. 5 that, although there seemed to be general agreement that the Committee on Information should be continued, it was not possible to say at the current stage whether it was desirable to make it permanent. The U.S. and Venezuelan delegations had proposed that after the initial 3-year period the Committee should be continued for additional periods of 3 years unless the General Assembly decided otherwise.

On Nov. 10 the Committee adopted by a vote of 34-2 (Belgium, France)-12 a resolution expressing the hope that administering powers "will furnish annually as complete information as possible on any action taken to bring the reports of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories to the attention of the authorities responsible for the territories for the implementation of educational, economic, and social policy, and on any problems which may arise in

giving effect to the general views expressed in these reports."

Discussion then turned to the third item on the Committee's agenda, the question of participation of non-self-governing territories in the work of the Committee on Information; on Nov. 11, a resolution favoring such participation was adopted.

Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary)—Approval of a joint resolution sponsored by 22 delegations completed the Committee's consideration of the question of the adoption of Spanish as a working language for the Economic and Social Council. The United States and the Philippines joined the countries of Latin America in sponsoring the proposal. The vote in favor of the adoption of Spanish was 43-11-1.

During the debate on the next item, the report by the Contributions Committee on the scale of assessments for the apportionment of U.N. expenses, Senator Alexander Wiley on Nov. 11 stated the U.S. view. He acknowledged that the Committee on Contributions each year has taken some steps toward the implementation of the principle that no member government shall contribute more than one-third of the U.N. ordinary expenses in any one year. He continued:

However, my Government has been and continues to be critical of the slow pace at which the necessary adjustments in the contribution scale are taking place. From 1949 to 1951, the United States percentage share was reduced 2 points and for 1953 the recommendation before us is for a further scaling down of only 1.78. We can understand that there may be reasons why the Contributions Committee, within its frame of reference, has hesitated to make what might appear to some to be drastic recommendations, but we see no reason why this Committee or the General Assembly should consider itself to be so limited. In fact, we believe that the Assembly has an obligation to go beyond the Committee's recommendations whenever this course is necessary for the good of the organization. My Government considers it to be a matter of prime importance that the one-third ceiling for the largest contributor be fully implemented. We also think it is imperative that those states which have experienced very substantial economic improvement since the end of the war should have this improvement reflected to the greatest possible extent in their rate of contribution to the United Nations.

G. F. Saksin (U.S.S.R.) argued on Nov. 13 that the proposed increase in his Government's assessment from 9.85 percent to 12.28 percent violated three criteria for determining assessments: per capita income, destruction caused by World War II, and ability to obtain foreign currency. It also exceeded the 10 percent ceiling on increases in assessments, he declared.

A U.S. proposal to make the one-third ceiling effective in 1953 was modified by an amendment put forward by Canada to change the effective date to 1954. This amendment was adopted on Nov. 14 by a vote of 19-10-19 (U.S. among those abstaining). Thus, although the U.S. proposal was not accepted for 1953, adherence to the one-third ceiling is assured for 1954. This action was

more favorable to the United States than were the recommendations of the Committee on Contributions.

Later that day, the Committee approved the 1953 scale of assessments by a vote of 38-7 (Soviet bloc, Cuba, Mexico) -3 (U.S., Philippines, Pakistan). The United States assessment, pending final action on the resolution by the Assembly, now stands at 35.12 percent for 1953.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2393. Pub. 4528. 71 pp. 25¢.

Third protocol of rectifications to the agreement of Oct. 30, 1947, between the United States and Other Governments—Dated at Annecy Aug. 13, 1949; entered into force Oct. 21, 1951.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2394. Pub. 4542. 230 pp. 50¢.

Protocol replacing schedule I (Australia) of the agreement of Oct. 30, 1947, between the United States and Other Governments—Dated at Annecy Aug. 13, 1949; entered into force Oct. 21, 1951.

Passport Visa Requirements. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2471. Pub. 4602. 7 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Spain—Dated at Madrid Jan. 21, 1952; entered into force Jan. 21, 1952.

Mutual Defense Assistance. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2418. Pub. 4663. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Norway—Signed at Oslo June 30, 1950; entered into force June 30, 1950.

Road Traffic. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2487. Pub. 4606. 57 pp. 20¢.

Convention, with annexes and protocol, between the United States and Other Governments—Dated at Geneva Sept. 19, 1949; ratified by the Senate Aug. 9, 1950; proclaimed by the President Apr. 16, 1952; entered into force Mar. 26, 1952.

Criminal Offenses, United States and Polish Armed Forces. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2409. Pub. 4627. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Poland—Signed at Warsaw Aug. 5 and 29, 1946; entered into force Aug. 29, 1946 and amendment dated at Warsaw Feb. 6 and Apr. 3 and 14, 1947; entered into force Apr. 14, 1947.

Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Ecuador. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2419. Pub. 4637. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ecuador supplementing agreement of Sept. 15, 1950—Signed at Quito Oct. 4 and 24, 1951; entered into force Oct. 29, 1951.

Termination of Reciprocal Trade Agreement of May 7, 1942. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2421. Pub. 4638. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Signed at Lima Sept. 12 and 28, 1951; entered into force Sept. 28, 1951.

Leased Naval and Air Bases, United States Fleet Anchorage in the Gulf of Paria. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2431. Pub. 4641. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and United Kingdom amending agreement of Mar. 27, 1941—Signed at Washington Feb. 6 and Mar. 6, 1951; entered into force Mar. 6, 1951.

Mutual Defense Assistance. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2424. Pub. 4637. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Union of South Africa—Signed at Washington Nov. 9, 1951; entered into force Nov. 9, 1951.

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment of Officers

Harold W. Mosely as Chief of the Division of Biographic Information, effective September 29.

Joseph S. Henderson as Chief of the Division of International Administration, effective October 29.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Nov. 10-14, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to Nov. 10 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 842 of Oct. 25, 843 of Oct. 28, 849 of Oct. 31, 854 of Nov. 3, 855 of Nov. 3, 856 of Nov. 3, 859 of Nov. 5, 861 of Nov. 6, 862 of Nov. 7, 864 of Nov. 7, and 868 of Nov. 12.

| No. | Date | Subject |
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| 866 | 11/10 | Death of President of Israel |
| 867 | 11/12 | Sargeant: UNESCO conference |
| †868 | 11/12 | Standing committee (ICAO) |
| 869 | 11/10 | Anderson: European unity |
| 870 | 11/13 | Vienna—peace congress |
| †871 | 11/13 | U.S.—Canada—Great Lakes treaty |
| *872 | 11/14 | Exchange of persons |
| 873 | 11/14 | Welfare conferences in India |

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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